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GLOBAL ANALYTICAL LESSONS FOR EVALUATING A 
MYANMAR SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND 
Oliver T. Gilbert † 
Abstract: After decades of international condemnation, Myanmar, also known as 
Burma, has initiated rapid political, economic, and legal reforms.  In recognition of these 
reforms, Western governments have broadly curtailed longstanding sanctions against 
investing in Myanmar.  This sudden opportunity for foreign companies to extract 
Myanmar’s plentiful petroleum resources has increased the need for Myanmar to 
implement resource revenue management strategies to guard against adverse 
consequences of the resource curse.  Among these strategies is a call by respected global 
commentators to create a Myanmar sovereign wealth fund (“SWF”).   
This article describes each of the main effects generally associated with the resource 
curse and analyzes how existing global SWFs have been designed to help countries 
prevent these problems.  This article then explores Myanmar’s current political and 
economic environment to speculate how establishing a SWF would address resource 
curse concerns and impact Myanmar.  In doing so, this article argues that Myanmar 
currently lacks necessary legal, political, economic, and managerial capacities to support 
a national sovereign wealth fund at the present time.   
I. INTRODUCTION  
Once described as an “outpost of tyranny” by former U.S. Secretary 
of State Condoleezza Rice,1 Myanmar has recently initiated a series of rapid 
political and economic reforms that have generated significant global 
attention.2  Western governments have recognized the pace of Myanmar’s 
sweeping reforms and have rewarded Myanmar by curtailing many 
longstanding economic sanctions on the country.3  As a result, foreign 
individuals and corporations are eyeing Myanmar as a “final frontier” for 
foreign direct investment.4   
Increased opportunities to invest in Myanmar will be particularly 
significant to the country’s oil and gas sector, where a high demand already 
                                                      
† M.A. (Johns Hopkins University), B.A. (George Washington University).  Many thanks to my 
fantastic and supportive family and friends who endured never-ending discussions about Myanmar and 
sovereign wealth funds. Special thanks to Dustin Drenguis and the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 
editorial staff.  Any errors are my own.  None of the views expressed here purport to reflect the views of 
my current or previous employers.  
1  Rice Names “Outposts of Tyranny,” BBC NEWS (Jan.19, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
americas/4186241.stm. 
2   See Timeline: Reforms in Burma, BBC NEWS (April 22, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 
world-asia-16546688. 
3  See id. 
4  Patrick Barta, Final Frontier: Firms Flock to Newly Opened Myanmar, WALL STREET JOURNAL 
(Nov. 12, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390443749204578050773460553586. 
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exists for the country’s proven petroleum reserves, consisting of 
approximately 10 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 50 million barrels of 
crude oil. 5  Resource revenue information released for the first time in July 
2012 state that the country collected USD 16 billion during 2006-2012 from 
Myanmar’s existing Yadana and Yetagun natural gas pipelines.6  In addition, 
the Shwe pipeline to China, which became operational in July 2013, will 
provide USD 54 billion to Myanmar over the next thirty years.7  Lastly, 
Myanmar’s Zawtika offshore natural gas pipeline, expected to produce 
natural gas for domestic consumption, is planned to open mid-year, 2014.8 
Zawtika project status updates are unavailable at the time of publication. 
Furthermore, in 2013, Myanmar invited previously prohibited Western 
companies to explore additional onshore and offshore blocks.9  However, 
anticipated increases in foreign direct investment are not limited to Western 
countries.  China and India both seek Myanmar’s resources to support their 
own energy needs and geopolitical goals in the region.10  In addition, with 
the support of the Asian Development Bank (“ADB”), countries in the 
Greater Mekong Sub-region have identified Myanmar’s petroleum resources 
as a key component of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) 
plans to establish and access trans-ASEAN energy sources.11 
The high demand for Myanmar’s petroleum resources and changes to 
the country’s regulatory landscape will provide Myanmar much needed 
revenue.  However, the sudden influx of non-renewable, resource-focused 
investment has led global commentators, including former World Bank 
                                                      
5  Cheang Chee Yew, Myanmar Prepares Ground to Boost Upstream Oil, Gas Investments, 
RIGZONE (July 1, 2013), http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/127412/Myanmar_Prepares_Ground_ 
to_Boost_Upstream_Oil_Gas_Investments.  
6  Ministry Reveals Gas Revenue for First Time, THE NATION, (July 18, 2012), 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/aec/Ministry-reveals-gas-revenue-for-first-time-30186368.html.  
7  China Begins Receiving Natural Gas from Shwe Pipeline, THE IRRAWADY (July 8, 2013), 
http://www.investmyanmar.biz/infoNews.php?id=1342; Demand for Suspension of Shwe Gas Project 
Raised, BURMA NEWS INTERNATIONAL (Oct. 2, 2013) http://www.bnionline.net/index.php/news/narinjara/ 
16290-demand-for-suspension-of-shwe-gas-project-raised.html.  
8  Kyaw Hsu Mon, Thai-Run Gas Field to Help Meet Burma's Power Needs, THE IRRAWADDY 
(March 28, 2014), http://www.irrawaddy.org/business/thai-run-gas-field-help-meet-burmas-power-
needs.html.  
9  Jacob Gronholt-Pederson, Myanmar Invites Foreign Energy Firms to Explore 23 Offshore O&G 
Blocks, RIGZONE (July 28, 2012), http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/119414/Myanmar_Invites_ 
Foreign_Energy_Firms_to_Explore_23_Offshore_OG_Blocks. 
10  China and India Vie for Myanmar,  ASIA BRIEFING (May 29, 2013), http://www.asiabriefing.com 
/news/2013/05/china-and-india-vie-for-myanmar/. 
11  Greater Mekong Subregion: Energy, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK http://www.adb.org/countries/ 
gms/sector-activities/energy (last visited May 22, 2014); Building a Sustainable Energy Future: The 
Greater Mekong Subregion, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, http://www.adb.org/publications/building-
sustainable-energy-future-greater-mekong-subregion (last visited May 22, 2014). 
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Chief Economist and Nobel Prize winner in Economics, Joseph Stiglitz, 
researchers from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the 
Bloomberg editorial staff to recommend that Myanmar create a national 
sovereign wealth fund (“SWF”) to better manage anticipated petroleum 
revenues and enable Myanmar to avoid problems generally associated with 
the “resource curse.” 12 
The resource curse, also known as the “paradox of plenty,” is a 
phenomenon in which countries with an abundance of non-renewable 
resources frequently experience stagnant or negative economic growth.13  In 
addition, it is common for these countries to then become overly dependent 
on commodity revenues, which can lead to a volatile state gross domestic 
product (“GDP”) and cause related adverse macroeconomic effects. 14  
Moreover, political corruption, also a component of resource curse theory, 
can spread due to the lack of effective legal and regulatory systems to 
manage revenues, resource rights, income distribution frameworks, and 
additional government operations.15   
Multiple countries have established SWFs to guard against adverse 
effects of the resource curse.  Drawing from these examples, global 
commentators suggest that at-risk countries should deposit resource 
revenues into a SWF with “watertight governance and clear investment 
rules.”16  However, this policy recommendation is unrealistic if overarching 
state structures have not already created an environment for this type of 
governance oasis to exist. 
This article analyzes global lessons from existing SWFs to evaluate 
how creating a resource-funded SWF would impact Myanmar and mitigate 
traditional resource curse concerns.  This subject is important and timely 
given Myanmar’s anticipated influx of extractive project revenue and the 
lack of clear strategies to avoid suffering from the resource curse.  In 
contrast to some global experts’ recommendations,17 this article is cautious 
of the short-term feasibility of a Myanmar SWF. 
                                                      
12   Siri Jegarajah, Myanmar Needs Sovereign Wealth Fund to Avoid Resources Curse: Stiglitz, CNBC 
(Jun. 2, 2012), http://www.cnbc.com/id/47698494; Myanmar’s Mandela Moment, BLOOMBERG VIEW (May 
19, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-19/myanmar-needs-help-to-manage-its-mandela-
moment.html. 
13  Resource Curse,  INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/resource-curse.asp (last 
visited July 11, 2013). 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16  Vikram Nehru, Myanmar’s Five Economic Priorities, EMERGING FRONTIERS (April 24, 2012), 
http://emergingfrontiersblog.com/2012/04/24/myanmars-five-economic-priorities/. 
17  See Jegarajah, supra note 12; Myanmar's Mandela Moment, supra note 12.  
582 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 23 NO. 3 
The structure of this article is as follows.  First, this article briefly 
defines sovereign wealth funds and acknowledges the limitations of 
generalizing diverse financial instruments under this umbrella.  Each 
following section then addresses key concerns that are generally associated 
with the resource curse and draws examples from brief case studies of 
existing global SWFs to describe how SWFs can mitigate these problems.  
This article then describes Myanmar’s related capacities or vulnerabilities 
before theorizing how a Myanmar SWF might impact those same problem 
areas.   
Following the analysis, this article identifies multiple important 
components for establishing a responsibly managed SWF and evaluates 
Myanmar’s balance of payments surplus, fiscal discipline, and prerequisite 
domestic legal and financial institutional capacities that are necessary to 
responsibly finance and administer a SWF.  In addition, this article analyzes 
SWFs’ ability to compensate for macroeconomic effects of the resource 
curse and discusses economic options for Myanmar.  Lastly, this article 
explores Myanmar’s rampant corruption and poor transparency policies to 
estimate Myanmar’s current ability to apply international governance best 
practices to managing a SWF. 
This article concludes by summarizing the institutional capacities in 
need of improvement prior to the creation of any type of Myanmar SWF.  
Furthermore, through the prism of analyzing SWFs, this article’s conclusion 
identifies key legal, economic, and political factors that must be reformed to 
maximize benefits from extractive resource projects without relying on 
complex financial tools.   
This article does not seek to label all SWFs as adverse financial 
instruments and frequently praises selected SWFs for their effective wealth 
management and responsible resource stewardship.  Instead, this article 
suggests that a Myanmar SWF may underperform or fail due to Myanmar’s 
current political and economic realities.  Consequently, a Myanmar SWF is 
not an appropriate resource revenue management strategy to maximize 
benefits at the current stage of Myanmar’s national development, but may be 
appropriate once Myanmar improves underlying state capacities outlined in 
this article.   
II. WHAT IS A SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND? 
The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, an organization dedicated to the 
study of these funds and other long-term investments, defines a SWF as, “a 
state-owned investment fund or entity that is commonly established from 
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balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the 
proceeds of privatizations, governmental transfer payments, fiscal surpluses, 
and/or receipts resulting from resource exports.”18  This definition can be 
further narrowed using a description of SWFs, by Monitor, a global strategic 
advisory firm, as investment funds owned by governments that are distinct 
from both official reserves and the capital available to state-owned-
enterprises (“SOEs”).19  This restricted definition allows for a more targeted 
analysis of fund operations by separating special fund operations from other 
state-guided financial operations.20 
This article addresses the major areas of concern associated with the 
resource curse and includes additional impacts when applicable.  It is 
important to recognize that even under the narrowed definition above, the 
term “sovereign wealth fund” is a broad classification that includes a variety 
of different investment vehicles, each tasked with their own unique 
objectives.  For example, commodity-based funds can be used for fiscal 
stabilization or preventing inflation, while non-commodity-based funds 
might be used to make investments with surplus amounts of a particular 
foreign currency.21 
Accordingly, it is unreasonable to describe one type of SWF as failing 
in regards to other SWF goals it was not designed to accomplish.  For 
example, a SWF designed to assist commodity price stability cannot be 
faulted for not providing individual annual dividends if it was not designed 
to do so.  As a result, countries may establish multiple independent SWFs in 
an effort to concurrently pursue multiple objectives, and this article 
recognizes that no single SWF can mitigate the simultaneous problems 
associated with the resource curse.  Therefore, analysis of SWFs in each of 
the following sections is careful to note how specific types of SWFs may 
address the specific concerns they were designed to influence. 
III. PREREQUISITE CAPACITIES 
Sovereign wealth funds require a range of capacities to meet financial 
or strategic objectives.  Among the most important are state revenue 
                                                      
18  What Is a Sovereign Wealth Fund?, SWF INSTITUTE, http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-
wealth-fund/ (last visited May 22, 2014). 
19  Victoria Barbary & Bernardo Bortolotti, Braving the New World: Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Investment in 2010, 38 THE MONITOR (2011). 
20  Daniel W. Drezner, White Whale or Red Herring?: Assessing Sovereign Wealth Funds, REP. 
GLASSHOUSE FORUM, 2008.  
21  Lee Hudson Teslik, Sovereign Wealth Funds, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 29, 2009), 
http://www.cfr.org/sovereign-wealth-funds/sovereign-wealth-funds/p15251. 
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surpluses, government fiscal discipline, and legal and economic experience 
needed to guide fund operations.  Unfortunately, Myanmar currently lacks 
many of these prerequisite capacities: it does not have a budgetary surplus, 
financial discipline has been absent, and it lacks financial and legal 
expertise.  These problems would put a burgeoning SWF at a disadvantage.  
This section describes these problems in detail by exploring funding 
concerns, fiscal discipline needs, and financial and legal capacity concerns.  
A. Funding 
SWFs are financed by national revenue in pursuit of a variety of 
economic goals.  Regardless of fund objectives or the sources of funding, 
contributions to SWFs should be the result of budgetary surpluses that 
enable states to finance investments with excess capital.22  According to 
Martin Skancke, the Director General of the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 
“[i]f a [sovereign wealth] fund is set up with an allocation rule that is not 
linked to actual surpluses, the accumulations of assets in the fund will not 
reflect actual savings.”23   
Put simply, countries without budget surpluses would likely have to 
borrow money to invest in a SWF while neglecting other fiscal obligations.  
For this precise reason, India recently canceled its plans to establish a SWF 
because the country lacks adequate foreign exchange reserves.  Indian 
officials had originally designated USD 10 billion for a state SWF, but the 
Indian Department of Economic Affairs advised the government to establish 
a fund only when the country enjoys a current account surplus.24  India is 
projected to have a balance of payments deficit, estimated at approximately 
5% of GDP, and plans to create a SWF have been tabled for the time being.25  
Myanmar’s balance of payments deficit amounted to approximately 
3.2% of GDP for 2012-2013. 26   However, Myanmar’s changing fiscal 
obligations as a partial result of international loan forgiveness by Japan and 
                                                      
22  Angela Cummine, Overcoming Divided Skepticism: Why the World's Sovereign Wealth Funds Are 
Not Paying Dividends, 6 INT. J. OF BASIC INCOME RES. 1, 9 (2011).  
23  Id. 
24  Finance Ministry Opposes Sovereign Wealth Fund out of Forex Reserves, THE ECONOMIC TIMES 
(Apr. 24, 2013), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-04-24/news/38790536_1_cash-rich-
psus-foreign-currency-reserves-foreign-exchange-reserves. 
25  R. Jagannathan, India Abandons a Stupid Idea: No Sovereign Wealth Fund, FIRSTBIZ. (Feb. 25, 
2013), http://www.firstbiz.com/economy/india-abandons-a-stupid-idea-no-sovereign-wealth-fund-
37014.html. 
26  Khin Myo Thwe, Burma's Budget Deficit Falls to 3.2 Percent, MIZZIMA NEWS (Jan. 25, 2013), 
http://archive-2.mizzima.com/business/8793-burmas-budget-deficit-falls-to-32-percent-.html?tmpl= 
component&print=1&layout=default&page=. 
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Norway should not be considered robust fiscal strength. 27   Ultimately, 
Myanmar’s deficit is a signal that Myanmar should fulfill financial 
obligations and reprioritize spending decisions before sterilizing national 
resource profits in a SWF.  Without a budgetary surplus, investments in a 
SWF are only investments with borrowed money.  Therefore, Myanmar 
should establish a budgetary surplus before investing in a SWF. 28 
B. Fiscal Discipline 
SWFs require a high degree of fiscal discipline to balance current 
government spending needs alongside realistic investment concerns.  States 
without a high degree of fiscal discipline may be prone to treat SWF assets 
as “rainy day” funds.  For example, Ireland took EUR 17.5 billion (USD 
23.1 billion) from its National Pensions Reserve Fund as part of the 
country’s bailout obligations with the International Monetary Fund 
(“IMF”).29   
In past decades, Myanmar’s military dictatorship exhibited an 
extensive history of misappropriation, corruption, and a lack of 
transparency.30  Known as the “Burmese way of Socialism”, from 1962 to 
1988, Myanmar’s military junta implemented a series of reforms that 
destroyed Myanmar’s economic productivity through mass nationalization, 
arbitrary policy driven by military leader, Ne Win’s personal superstitions, 
and brutal military oppression.31  Decades of disastrous reform is one of the 
largest reasons why Myanmar lags far behind its neighbors’ rapid 
development.32  These poor governance practices also contributed to false 
reporting of economic data, leaving the international community without 
clear information about Myanmar’s true economic landscape.33 
                                                      
27  Myanmar Signs Deal with Foreign Creditors, FT.COM (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms 
/s/0/9b2d6e4c-68b2-11e2-9a3f-00144feab49a.html#axzz32VKE6oJY  (last visited May 4, 2014). 
28  Jagannathan, supra note 25. 
29  Rich Barbieri, EU Unveils Irish Bailout, CNNMONEY (Dec. 2, 2010), http://money.cnn.com 
/2010/11/28/news/international/ireland_bailout/index.htm. 
30  See Myanmar Profile, BBC NEWS (May 16, 2014), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-
12990563. 
31  Mark Tallentire, The Burma Road to Ruin, THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 28, 2007), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/sep/28/burma.uk; 1962 Coup & Ne Win Regime. OXFORD BURMA 
ALLIANCE, http://www.oxfordburmaalliance.org/1962-coup--ne-win-regime.html. 
32  Michael Schuman, Will Burma Become Asia’s Next Economic Tiger?, TIME (Aug. 22, 2012), 
http://business.time.com/2012/08/22/will-burma-become-asias-next-economic-tiger/. 
33  A Legacy of Mismanagement: The State of Burma’s Economy, MIZZIMA NEWS (July 3, 2009), 
http://archive-2.mizzima.com/edop/interview/2400-a-legacy-of-mismanagement-the-state-of-burmas-
economy.html (last visited May 4, 2014). 
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Recent governance and economic reforms offer potential for rising 
generations of leaders to guide Myanmar’s financial operations with greater 
fiscal diligence than their predecessors. 34  Nonetheless, fiscal discipline and 
fiscal capacity must be developed over time and likely with the guidance of 
welcomed international advisors.  However, SWFs should not be considered 
hands-on training for establishing fiscal discipline, nor can a SWF’s 
existence jump-start it.  A study conducted by Revenue Watch Institute 
found no direct and demonstrable correlation between the existence of a 
SWF and improved fiscal performance.35  
Literature regarding Mongolia’s planned SWF has also argued that 
effective and sustainable fiscal discipline must be established well in 
advance of the creation of SWFs for funds to be successful. 36  Similarly, 
according to Eric Parrado, a former manager of Chile’s SWFs, without fiscal 
discipline “a fund is not a SWF in anything but name.”37  
C. Financial & Legal Capacity 
Sovereign wealth funds are managed separately from other central 
bank activities because SWFs are complex financial vehicles that require 
innovative and flexible methods that are best managed outside the scope of 
typical budgetary operations.38  Financial expertise is important to ensure 
SWF funds are invested appropriately.  One possibility for countries, like 
Myanmar, that lack financial expertise is to seek assistance from foreign 
financial experts.  However, foreign experts may be disconnected from 
domestic interests, as highlighted in examples with Nigeria’s proposed SWF, 
described below.  Moreover, Myanmar also lacks legislative capacity, which 
is necessary to outline the SWF’s rules and objectives. 39  
Sovereign wealth fund experts Adam D. Dixon and Ashby Monk have 
argued that SWFs must be staffed with financial and legal technocrats to 
                                                      
34  Schuman, supra note 32. 
35  ANTOINE HEUTY & JUAN ARISTI, FOOL’S GOLD: ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF ALTERNATIVE 
FISCAL INSTRUMENTS DURING THE COMMODITIES BOOM AND THE GLOBAL CRISIS 10 (Revenue Watch 
Institute ed., 2013), available at http://archive-2011.revenuewatch.org/files/RWI_Fools_Gold_Heuty_ 
Aristi_FINAL.pdf.  
36  Loch Adamson, Institutional Investor: Mongolia Aims to Join the SWF Ranks, ORIGO (2011), 
http://www.origoplc.com/press/institutional-investor-mongolia-aims-to-join-the-swf-ranks/. 
37  Id. 
38  Adam D. Dixon & Ashby H.B. Monk, The Design and Governance of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 
SOC. SCI. RESEARCH NETWORK (Oct. 30, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=1951573. 
39  Id.  
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effectively design and manage a fund.40  However, many resource-dependent 
and developing states seeking to establish a SWF lack domestic financial or 
legal experts. 41  Without domestic fiscal discipline, financial expertise, and 
legislative clarity, public officials may poorly allocate funds to a state SWF 
to the detriment of the state. 42  As a result, states sometimes seek foreign 
experts to manage funds. 43  However, externally managed SWFs may be 
disconnected from domestic interests and can raise public concerns for 
increased domestic control over their national resources. 44  In addition, 
generally speaking, relying on foreign experts to solve domestic problems 
may not provide a sustainable solution to ongoing state planning needs.  
Nigeria’s planned oil-funded SWFs exemplify this dilemma.  Article 
6(1) of the legislation establishing the Nigeria Sovereign Investment 
Authority provides that, “The Authority may at any time appoint asset 
managers outside the Authority to manage its assets as may be specified by 
the board.”45  However, Ayo Salami, a London-based asset manager at Duet 
Management, forecasted an anticipated domestic pressure for Nigeria’s SWF 
to invest with Nigerian managers even though the country lacks enough 
Nigerian financial experts to reasonably accommodate this need. 46  
Accordingly, in 2013, Nigeria announced that JP Morgan will manage the 
country’s SWF.47  Uche Orji, a former UBS analyst and Nigerian fund 
manager who has lived outside of Nigeria for the past seventeen years, will 
manage the Nigerian SWF.48  Time will tell if JP Morgan’s mixed foreign 
management team can reconcile maximizing returns with accommodating 
domestic investment priorities.   
Myanmar currently lacks the financial or legislative expertise 
necessary to avoid the problems demonstrated in the examples above.  
                                                      
40  Id.  
41  Id.  
42  Id.  
43  See e.g., Ben Agande, JPMorgan to Manage Sovereign Wealth Funds, VANGUARD NEWS (Feb. 
21, 2013), http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/02/jp-morgan-to-manage-soverign-wealth-funds/; Agustino 
Fontevecchia, Goldman Sachs Lost 98% of Libya's $1.3B Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment,  FORBES 
MAGAZINE (May 31, 2011), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2011/05/31/goldman-
sachs-lost-98-of-libyas-1-3b-sovereign-wealth-fund-investment/.  
44  Sarah Rundell, African Countries Come to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Party, TOP1000FUNDS.COM 
(Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.top1000funds.com/analysis/2012/12/05/african-countries-come-to-the-
sovereign-wealth-fund-party/ (last visited May 22, 2014). 
45  Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority Act (2011) 64 O.G. 98 (Nigeria), available at  
http://nsia.com.ng/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/NSIA_ACT.pdf. 
46  Id. 
47   Agande, supra note 43.  
48  Tolu Ogunlesi, Meet The Man Who’ll Manage Nigeria’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, VENTURES 
AFRICA (July 15, 2013), http://www.ventures-africa.com/2013/07/hot-shot-nigerian-export-returns-home/. 
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Myanmar’s banking system is broken.49  According to a report by the 
Myanmar Union Auditor General’s Office, the Myanmar Economic Bank, a 
large state-owned bank, has not generated a profit in twenty-two years and 
has been operating at a loss since 1990.50   
Decades of isolation have also drastically reduced technocratic 
management experience that could be applied to managing a SWF.  
According to Mr. Turnell, Myanmar’s economic governance is limited “to a 
handful of individuals skilled in policy formulation, and fewer still schooled 
in the attributes necessary for institution building.”51  More recently, in 
2013, Myanmar’s parliament passed legislation to clear the way for 
Myanmar to establish an independent central bank.52  Myanmar should first 
demonstrate an ability to responsibly administer routine functions of this 
basic independent body before it creates an independent SWF.  Likewise, 
Myanmar should encourage domestic financial expertise before outsourcing 
complex financial operations to foreign experts to prioritize national 
interests, even if national interests do not maximize financial best interests. 
Legislation outlining a SWF’s rules and investment objectives prior to 
the fund’s creation is essential for preventing systemic failures.  One historic 
example of this type of failure is Papua New Guinea’s former SWF, the 
Mineral Resources Stabilization Fund (“MRSF”). 53   The MRSF was 
established in 1974 to manage revenue from the country’s Panguana copper 
mine and reduce commodity price volatility.54  Original legislation planned 
for the fund to collect all revenues from extractive resource projects and then 
fund Papua New Guinea’s state budget using a complex formula for 
maximum annual withdrawals.55   However, amendments to the MRSF Act 
allowed unlimited government withdrawals from the account, and the fund 
                                                      
49  Sean Turnell, Burma’s Economic Transition: Where It’s At, Where It Might Go, ASIALINK, (May 
2012) (on file with the author).   
50  Myanmar Economic Bank Has Been Losing Money for Two Decades: Audit Report, ELEVEN 
NEWS (July 13, 2013). http://elevenmyanmar.com/business/2752-myanmar-economic-bank-has-been-
losing-money-for-two-decades-audit-report. 
51  See Turnell, supra note 49. 
52  Natasha Brereton-Fukui, Myanmar Is Closer to Autonomous Central Bank, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (June 9, 2013),  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873239499045785351 
41675555294.html.  Note that as of publication of this article, the president has yet to sign the legislation. 
53  MARTIN GOULD, MANAGING MANNA FROM BELOW: SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND 
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES IN THE PACIFIC, (Australian Treasury Department ed., 2010), available at 
http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1783/HTML/docshell.asp?URL=05_SWFs_in_the_Pacific.htm. 
54   Id. 
55   Id. 
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was forced to close in 1999 once government borrowing under original legal 
guidelines became unsustainable.56  
Myanmar’s legal expertise is similarly limited.  According to a report 
by the global law firm DLA Piper, Myanmar graduates approximately 200 to 
300 lawyers each year.57  However, qualifications to gain admittance to law 
school in Myanmar are the lowest among all professions in the country, and 
students generally memorize information without learning a practical 
application of law.58  In fact, the Myanmar Union Attorney General assumes 
that “newly-hired lawyers in his office have no sufficient legal education 
prior to entering their six-month training program.”59   However, even 
though Myanmar graduates and trains a marginal number of lawyers each 
year, over 1,000 attorneys have been reprimanded, suspended, and disbarred 
over the past twenty years. 60  Lastly, Mr. Turnell reports that “the IMF and 
[World Bank] have found few, if any, legally qualified (or skilled) 
counterparties in the Burmese government” to assist in drafting laws.61  
As a result, drafting legislation has historically been a challenge for 
Myanmar.  In his report, Mr. Turnell describes a common practice in both 
the previous and current governments to sub-contract the legislative writing 
process to outside parties.62  Alarmingly, Mr. Turnell’s report anecdotally 
cites that a South Korean sub-contractor’s flawed translations into domestic 
corporate taxation law ultimately made the law unenforceable and 
meaningless.63  Steps toward reform will hopefully include an openness to 
accept international assistance to guide legal drafting in the future.  
Ultimately, Myanmar’s lack of domestic financial or legal capacity 
means that a Myanmar SWF likely lacks the technocratic oversight 
necessary to establish SWF rules and objectives, manage the operations of a 
SWF, and accommodate domestic pressures.  While foreign financial experts 
could be used to manage fund operations, promoting domestic financial 
expertise would offer more sustainable fund guidance and help ensure that 
fund operations are being directed in accordance to national best interests 
even if actions do not maximize fund profits.  Myanmar must take steps to 
strengthen these weaknesses prior to the creation of a SWF.  
                                                      
56   Id. 
57  DLA PIPER ET AL., MYANMAR RULE OF LAW ASSESSMENT 36 (Mar. 2013), available at 
http://viewer.zmags.com/publication/69f423a6. 
58   Id. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. at 35. 
61  See Turnell, supra note 49. 
62  Id. 
63  Id. 
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IV. ADDRESSING THE RESOURCE CURSE 
Analyzing individual components of the resource curse can help 
determine how effectively sovereign wealth funds can mitigate similar 
resource curse concerns.  Gauging a SWF’s utility toward this task alongside 
Myanmar’s current economic, social, and political realities provides greater 
insight into how a SWF would likely impact Myanmar.  As a result, this 
section first discusses economic factors of the resource curse, such as 
economic diversification, inflation, exchange rate stability, and commodity 
price stability.  Thereafter, this section evaluates the need for 
intergenerational justice and savings, as well as the opportunity cost of 
investing in a SWF.  Lastly, this section examines points of conflict and 
political division, including varying levels of domestic political consensus, 
public consent, and the equitable division of wealth.  
A.   Economic Diversity 
The resource curse theory hypothesizes that dependence on 
commodity revenue can direct already limited investments further towards 
that same industry to increase efficiency and profitability for extracting 
proven resources.64  However, without reinvesting profits into other sectors, 
countries will subsequently fail to diversify their economies.65  In fact, the 
ADB found in its 2012-2014 Interim Country Partnership Strategy that 
roughly one-third of Myanmar’s USD 13.6 billion of foreign direct 
investment has been directed to the country’s petroleum sector and that these 
investments are unlikely to increase local employment.66   Oil and gas 
extraction projects, like those planned in Myanmar, typically do not create 
many jobs for local populations.67  This is particularly troublesome because 
Myanmar’s unemployment rate hovered around 40% of the population in 
2013 and is desperately in need of increased opportunities for job creation 
and economic diversification.68  However, as the following section shows, 
international investment options may not be preferable for building 
                                                      
64  Masoud Movahed, Why Should Resource-based Economies Diversify?, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 25, 
2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/01/2013116152324850803.html. 
65  Id. 
66  Asian Dev. Bank, Sector Assessment (Summary): Energy, in INTERIM COUNTRY PARTNERSHIP 
STRATEGY: MYANMAR, 2012-2014 (Jul. 3, 2013), available at http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/icps-
mya-2012-2014-ssa-01.pdf. 
67  See Movahed, supra note 64. 
68  Nearly 40% Unemployment in Myanmar, BANGKOK POST (Jan 25, 2013) 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/most-recent/332618/. 
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economic diversity.  In addition, as described in this section, Myanmar 
already maintains a capacity to increase economic diversification without 
using SWFs and recently passed legislation that will assist foreign direct 
investment opportunities in the country.69 
States have sought to use SWFs to make international investments in a 
variety of industries in a top-down approach to diversify domestic 
economies. 70  Some countries with unique economic and geographic 
conditions have used international investment strategies like SWFs in lieu of 
domestic economic diversity with some degree of success, but building a 
self-sustaining and diverse, domestic economic base is virtually always 
preferable to building a diversified international financial support system.71  
This is because building a diverse domestic economy to prevent against 
commodity or global shocks is more sustainable than creating an investment 
fund to guard against the effects of similar shocks. 72 
Myanmar has alternative opportunities for economic diversification 
beyond petroleum.  Myanmar is the world’s second largest exporter of beans 
and pulses after Canada.73  In addition, Myanmar can increase production of 
its significant garment, hardwood, and gemstone industries.74  Moreover, 
tourism rose sharply from 2011 to 2012, and Myanmar is currently working 
on a master tourism plan with the German-based Hans Seidel Foundation 
and the ADB to further expand tourism infrastructure and services for the 
increasing numbers of tourists expected in the near future.75  
Myanmar was also formerly known as the “rice bowl of the world” for 
its world-leading rice exports before agricultural productivity was reduced 
by the failed “Burmese Way of Socialism” policy. 76  According to the 
International Rice Research Institute, Myanmar could improve or regain its 
agricultural sector’s former status by expanding farmers’ access to credit, 
increasing storage and production facilities, and improving transportation 
                                                      
69  The Foreign Investment Law, 2012, No.21, art. 9 (Myan.).  
70  David McKenzie & Victoria Eastwood, Oil-rich Angola Bids to Secure Future with $5bn Wealth 
Fund, CNN (Oct. 25, 2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/25/world/africa/angola-oil-sovereign-wealth-
fund/index.html. 
71  Bryan Balin, Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Critical Analysis 10 (Sept. 23, 2009) (unpublished 
dissertation, Johns Hopkins University) (on file with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1477725. 
72  Id. 
73  See Turnell, supra note 49. 
74  Id. 
75  Burma Developing Master Tourism Plan, MIZZIMA NEWS (Oct. 6, 2012), http://archive-
2.mizzima.com/business/8166-burma-developing-master-tourism-plan.html?tmpl=component&print=1& 
layout=default&page.  
76  See Turnell, supra note 49. 
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systems.77  Improving outputs in most of the above sectors will likely 
increase transportation and logistics business opportunities to export 
products to market.  Resultantly, Myanmar already has a variety of existing 
options to expand domestic economic diversity without needing to depend 
on a SWF to create an internationally focused financial base. 
Recently introduced legislation may offer future opportunities to 
expand authentic economic diversity.  Myanmar’s 2012 Foreign Direct 
Investment Law (“FDI Law”) was signed in 2012 and allows foreign 
corporations to retain up to 100% of its investment in Myanmar. 78  In 
contrast to Myanmar’s 1988 Foreign Investment Law, the 2012 FDI Law 
also allows foreign investors to enter into unrestricted joint ventures.79  
Article 6(a)(2) of the 1988 Foreign Investment Law states, “if a joint venture 
is formed the foreign capital shall be at least 35 percent of the total 
capital.”80  In addition, the 2012 FDI Law provides land rights previously 
absent in the 1988 Foreign Investment Law.81  Under this revision, “[Section 
31]:  The Commission may allow the investor the actually required period of 
the right to lease or use land up to initial 50 years depending upon the 
category of business, industry and the volume of investment.” 82  
Furthermore, Section 32 states that foreign investors “may extend the period 
[a] consecutive 10 years and for further 10 years after the expiry of such 
period . . . after the expiry of the term permitted under section 31 . . . .”83  
This seventy year time-frame is particularly attractive for capital intensive, 
long-term building projects, like hotels or factories. 
The 2012 FDI Law also supports job creation by requiring investors to 
hire an increasing number of Myanmar nationals over the first six years of 
corporate operations.  According to Chapter XI, Section 24(a), “citizens shall 
have been appointed at least 25 percent within the first two-year[s], at least 
50 percent within the second two-year[s] and at least 75 percent within the 
third two-year[s] from the year of commencement of the business.” 84  
Importantly, the 2012 FDI Law’s Section 28 also “guarantees that a business 
formed under the permit shall not be nationalized within the term of contract 
                                                      
77  William Boot, Can Burma Become World Rice Bowl Again?, THE IRRAWADDY (Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/business/can-burma-become-world-rice-bowl-again.html/. 
78  The Foreign Investment Law, 2012, No.21, art. 9 (Myan.). 
79  The Union of Myanmar Foreign Investment Law, 1988, No.10, art. 6(a)(2) (Myan.); The Foreign 
Investment Law, 2012, No.21, art. 9 (Myan.). 
80  The Union of Myanmar Foreign Investment Law, 1988, No.10, art. 6(a)(2) (Myan.). 
81   The Foreign Investment Law, 2012, No.21, art. 31 (Myan.). 
82   Id.  
83   Id. at art. 32.  
84   Id. at art. 24(a).  
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or the extended term if such term is extended.”85  Although the 1988 Foreign 
Investment Law also included this provision, it is wise for the government to 
guarantee that nationalization practices once prevalent during the Burmese 
way of Socialism era will not once again be employed during the country’s 
rapid increase in foreign investment.86 
Lastly, in July 2013, Myanmar’s parliament, the Pyihtaungsu Hluttaw, 
signaled that it would accept President Thein Sein’s push to join the World 
Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”) to extend 
greater guarantees and assistance to foreign investors.87  The combination of 
the above-mentioned legal reforms in the 2012 FDI Law and the steps to 
increase foreign investment guarantees will increase domestic investment 
opportunities and economic diversification. 
Myanmar policymakers should also recognize that SWFs do not 
consistently achieve economic diversification goals.  A 2007 IMF report 
found that “the more reliant a country is on one commodity, the less 
effective its SWF is in achieving its goals.”88  Venezuela’s SWF, the National 
Development Fund, is a shining example of this dependency.  The Fund, 
more commonly known as the Fonden Fund, was created to allocate oil 
revenues separate from the national budget and help diversify Venezuela’s 
economy.89  Aside from being a glaring instance of corruption, discussed in 
a subsequent section of this article,90 Fonden has actually contributed to 
Venezeula’s increased dependence on oil exports, from 80% ten years ago to 
96% of exports in 2012. 91   
Some states have also made internal investments with SWFs to 
improve domestic diversification.  One example of internal investment with 
SWFs is Angola’s petroleum-funded Fundo Soberano de Angola, designed to 
make targeted domestic investments in infrastructure projects and the 
hospitality industry.92  
However, Myanmar should note that internal investment strategies 
with SWFs are so risky that some states have prohibited their SWFs from 
                                                      
85   Id. at art. 28(a).  
86   The Union of Myanmar Foreign Investment Law, 1988, No.10, art. 22 (Myan.) 
87  Government Agrees to Join World Bank Program, BURMA NEWS INTERNATIONAL (July 10, 2013), 
http://bnionline.net/index.php/news/mizzima/15737-govt-agrees-to-join-world-bank-program.html. 
88  Balin, supra note 71. 
89  Brian Ellsworth & Eyanir Chinea, Special Report: Chavez’s Oil Fed Fund Obscures Venezuela 
Money Trail, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/26/us-venezuela-chavez-
fund-idUSBRE88P0N020120926. 
90  See infra Part V. 
91  See infra Part V. 
92  McKenzie & Eastwood, supra note 70. 
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making similar domestic investments.  Norway’s SWF, the Norwegian 
Government Pension Fund Global (“NGPG”), is a leading example of SWF 
good governance and expressly prohibits investment in “infrastructure such 
as roads, railways, harbours, airports, and other basic infrastructure” in 
Chapter 3, Section 3-1(3) of its incorporating Investment Mandate93 because 
“domestic recycling of surplus risks fanning inflation and discourag[es] 
competitiveness.”94  
Additionally, the ability for SWFs to increase and advance research 
and development through foreign investments is limited.  Deloitte, a global 
consulting firm, found that SWFs can, “move up the value curve quickly as 
they acquire legal rights to intellectual property and access to research, 
design, and development that may take years to develop at home.” 95  
However, acquisition of intellectual property does not simultaneously train 
personnel to apply intellectual property, and funds “do not offer an 
alternative to developing a capable and active workforce”96  Therefore, 
investing in foreign companies using SWFs to obtain legal intellectual 
property rights would be of little consequence for Myanmar’s vastly 
undertrained workforce unless local workers receive the extensive training 
needed to utilize that technology towards domestic commercial operations.97   
Ultimately, Myanmar has existing and forecasted opportunities to 
develop economic diversification without a SWF. 
B. Macroeconomic Stabilization 
Sovereign wealth funds are often tasked with offsetting negative 
macroeconomic effects associated with the resource curse, including the 
need to manage inflation risk stemming from foreign currency exchange 
rates and stabilize commodity price volatility.98  However, using SWFs to 
                                                      
93  NORGES BANK INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, INVESTMENT MANDATE FOR THE GOVERNMENT 
PENSION FUND GLOBAL § 3-1(3) (Apr. 20, 2013), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/1719656/ 
gpfg_madate_042013.pdf.  
94  Barbary & Bortolotti, supra note 19.  
95  PRITI S. RAJAGOPALAN & SUNIL RONGALA, INSURANCE FIRMS: THE MISSING LINK IN THE 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND ACQUISITION SPREE 3 (Deloitte Res. ed. 2008), available at 
https://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/us_fsi_IN_SWFMissing 
LinkJune08.pdf. 
96  Dixon & Monk, supra note 38.  
97  See infra Part IV.D (explaining that education and social services lack hard metrics and are a poor 
fit for Sovereign Wealth Fund).  
98  YAEL SELFIN ET AL., THE IMPACT OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS ON ECONOMIC SUCCESS 2 (Oct. 
2011), available at http://www.pwc.co.uk/en_UK/uk/assets/pdf/the-impact-of-sovereign-wealth-funds-on-
economic-success.pdf. 
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mitigate macroeconomic problems depends on preexisting institutional 
financial and fiscal capacities, described in Section I, that Myanmar 
currently lacks.  Furthermore, devoting resources to SWF stabilization 
efforts can detract funds from building a genuine diversified domestic base 
that can serve as a natural guard against future macroeconomic challenges.99 
1. Inflation and Exchange Rate Stability 
Large and sudden profits collected from the sale of resources can 
trigger a phenomenon known as “Dutch Disease.”100  Named after the 1960s 
Dutch economic crisis, which was caused by the discovery of natural gas in 
the North Sea, Dutch Disease occurs when countries experience sharp 
increases in foreign currency, often as a result of extractive resource 
projects.101  The influx of foreign capital causes the real exchange rate to 
rapidly appreciate followed by wage inflation.102  Increased domestic costs 
then make manufactured products more expensive and less competitive in 
the global marketplace because trading partners are forced to pay higher 
costs for the same products as a result of purchasing goods with a more 
expensive currency.103 
Sovereign wealth funds focused on currency stabilization can help 
manage currency exchange rate stability to prevent inflation by investing 
foreign exchange reserves in short-term, liquid assets that grant states the 
flexibility to buy or sell their own currency on international markets and 
maintain a preferable exchange rate relative to a global base currency. 104  
However, a study regarding SWF Dutch Disease conducted by the 
Australian Industry Group, an industry group representing over 60,000 
Australian businesses, found that SWFs can assist stabilization, but cannot 
insulate economies from currency appreciation alone and should be 
                                                      
99  Balin, supra note 71. 
100  Is the “Natural Resources Curse” Not Quite True?, FREAKONOMICS (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://freakonomics.com/2011/04/04/is-the-natural-resource-curse-not-quite-true/. 
101 Id. 
102  Id. 
103 Tamara Gomes, Aid, Cost Inflation and ‘Dutch Disease’: Effects and Implications, ADB INST. 
(Nov. 10, 2005), http://www.adbi.org/discussion-paper/2005/11/10/1491.tsunami.sri.lanka/aid.cost. 
inflation.and.dutch.disease.effects.and.implications. 
104  TAMARA GOMES, THE IMPACT OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
STABILITY 6 (Bank of Canada ed., Sep. 2008), available at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2010/01/dp08-14.pdf.  
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complemented by structural legal reforms to tax systems, labor practices, 
and competition policies.105  
As argued in this paper, Myanmar presently lacks the legal and 
structural abilities to complement potential SWF’s activities similar to the 
recommendations by the Australian Industry Group.  In November 2013, the 
World Bank estimated that Myanmar’s economy would grow by 6.8% in 
2014 due to energy extraction, foreign direct investment, and construction 
projects.106  Should inflation rise to critical levels as a result of increased 
petroleum and non-petroleum related foreign direct investment, Myanmar’s 
government should explore traditional monetary policies and build a 
domestic base for sustainable and diversified economic growth before 
creating a SWF as a safety net to protect against stability fluctuations.107   
 
2. Commodity Price Volatility  
 
Commodity price volatility is a large component of the resource curse.  
States that are dependent on commodity revenue, like petroleum resources, 
are vulnerable to sharp market shifts because such a large percentage of their 
state income relies on strong global prices for these resources.  As a result, 
when global prices shift, commodity dependent states may realize annual 
windfall profits or suffer massive budgetary crises.108  Similar to lessons 
from the Papua New Guinea MRSF’s failures, exampled above, establishing 
clear legal frameworks for SWF management can provide more dependable 
estimates of how much resource revenue is available to fund annual 
government spending. 
Trinidad and Tobago’s Heritage Stabilization Fund (“HSF”), 
established in 2000 and financed with petroleum revenues, is an example of 
how guiding legislation can be implemented to mitigate commodity price 
volatility.109  The HSF’s founding legislation, cited below, clearly outlines 
the SWF’s purpose and goals:  
                                                      
105  AUSTL. INDUSTRY GROUP, MANAGING AUSTRALIA’S MINING BOOM 1, 12 (Nov. 29, 2010), 
available at http://www.aigroup.com.au/portal/binary/com.epicentric.contentmanagement.servlet.Content 
DeliveryServlet/LIVE_CONTENT/Economic%2520Indicators/Research%2520Notes/2010/Sovereign_wea
lth_fund.pdf. 
106  Jared Ferrie, Myanmar Economy to Grow 6.8 Pct Next Yr; Inflation at Risk – World Bank, 
REUTERS (Nov 6, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/06/myanmar-economy-idUSL3N0IR 
38420131106. 
107  See HEUTY & ARISTI, supra note 35. 
108  Id.  
109  Heritage and Stabilization Fund: Trinidad and Tobago, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INST., 
http://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/heritage-and-stabilization-fund/. 
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. . . [Section 3] (2) The purpose of the Fund is to save and invest 
surplus petroleum revenues derived from production business to 
– 
(a) cushion the impact on or sustain public expenditure capacity 
during periods of revenue downturn whether caused by a fall in 
prices of crude oil or natural gas; (b) generate an alternate 
stream of income so as to support public expenditure capacity 
as a result of revenue downturn caused by the depletion of non-
renewable petroleum resources; and (c) provide a heritage for 
future generations, of citizens of Trinidad and Tobago from 
savings and investment income derived from the excess 
petroleum revenues.110 
In meeting goals to protect against commodity price shocks, the Fund 
established an eleven-year average consisting of the past five years, a 
forecast of the current year, and incorporates expectations of the next five 
years in Section 13(3).111  Doing so legislates a general price level for the 
government to use when calculating spending forecasts and limits inherent 
risks by smoothing prices needed for annual speculation of a volatile 
commodity.112  Importantly, the HSF’s guiding legislation also includes an 
expressed guard against unsustainable withdrawals.113  According to Section 
15(3), “no withdrawal may be made from the Fund in any financial year, 
where the balance standing to the credit of the Fund would fall below one 
billion dollars in the currency of the United States of America, if such 
withdrawal were to be made.”114 
All together, the HSF’s strategy paid off handsomely in 2008.  The 
Fund previously set its estimates of oil prices at USD 45 per barrel in 
2007.115  In 2008, oil’s global price sharply rose and Trinidad and Tobago 
gained an additional USD 3 billion, or eleven percent of the country’s GDP, 
compared to previous estimates.116  
Petroleum commodities are highly volatile,117 and a realistic barrel 
price drop in 2008 could have sharply reduced the profits available to 
                                                      
110  Heritage and Stabilisation Fund Act, 2007, §3(2) (Act No. 6/2007) (Trin. & Tobago). 
111  See id; see also HEUTY & ARISTI, supra note 35. 
112 See HEUTY & ARISTI, supra note 35. 
113 Heritage and Stabilisation Fund Act, 2007, §3(2) (Act No. 6/2007) (Trin. & Tobago). 
114 Id. at §15(3). 
115 See HEUTY & ARISTI, supra note 35. 
116  Id. 
117  See Cait Murphy, Why Oil Prices Are So Voilatile, CBSNEWS (Sep. 10, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-51337483/why-oil-prices-are-so-volatile/. 
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Trinidad and Tobago.  Trinidad and Tobago was able to avoid this risk by 
prudently establishing legal frameworks to govern the fund and by applying 
financial management practices to its operations.118  However, as previously 
discussed,119 Myanmar has yet to demonstrate its ability to apply similar 
responsible legal or financial practices.  As a result, the HSF can provide 
valuable lessons for fund management, but Myanmar must build the legal 
and financial oversight practices that contributed to the HSF’s success to 
enable itself to share the same rewards. 
Lastly, while states like Trinidad and Tobago have found some success 
with SWF stability operations,120 a 2007 report commissioned by the IMF 
found little evidence that SWFs in natural resource exporting states were 
able to “smooth out” commodity volatility between times of strong and weak 
commodity prices.121  This was partially attributable to independent SWFs 
acting disconnected from state financial decision-makers. 122  
Economic diversification should be the primary recipient of finite 
revenue rather than creating a financial buffer against volatility caused by 
not diversifying domestic economies.  Therefore, policymakers should not 
view the creation of a Myanmar SWF as a panacea for the deeper problems 
of commodity price volatility. 
C. Intergenerational Justice & Savings 
Intergenerational justice, also known as intergenerational equity, 
refers to efforts to ensure future generations can share benefits from the 
country’s limited non-renewable resources. 123   These benefits can be 
preserved physical deposits, funds set aside for future expenses, or public 
institutions financed with resource wealth.124  As a result, a SWF may ensure 
intergenerational justice concerns are met prior to approving additional 
extractive projects. 125   
Revenue collected from extracting non-renewable resources is only a 
change in the physical nature of a state’s existing assets and does not 
                                                      
118 See HEUTY & ARISTI, supra note 35. 
119  See infra Part X. 
120  See HEUTY & ARISTI, supra note 35. 
121  Balin, supra note 71. 
122  Id. 
123 Lukas Meyer, Intergenerational Justice, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Apr. 3, 
2003), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-intergenerational/. 
124 See HEUTY & ARISTI, supra note 35. 
125 ROBERT CARLING & STEPHEN KIRCHER, FUTURE FUNDS OR FUND EATERS? THE CASE AGAINST A 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND FOR AUSTRALIA (Center for Independent Studies ed., 2012), available at 
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JUNE 2014  EVALUATING A MYANMAR SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND 599 
represent new income for countries.126  As a result, the monetization of non-
renewable resources underlines the need to ensure intergenerational justice 
prior to approving extractive projects.  The goal of intergenerational justice 
is to ensure that future generations are able to share the benefits of a 
country’s non-renewable resources.127  One way to pursue this goal is to save 
a portion of the resource revenue until more developed governance practices 
can guide spending priorities.128  However, there are problems with this 
strategy.  
In countries with poor governance histories, like Myanmar, there is no 
guarantee that future spending decisions will be guided by wiser decision 
makers.  In addition, SWFs are not guaranteed to yield future profits.  Lastly, 
since SWFs can be raided as “rainy day” funds, described in detail below, 
one must question whether state revenue invested in a SWF better 
contributes to national building than investments in state and social services.  
In light of these realities, some commentators have proposed ring fencing a 
portion of state revenues from extractive projects in SWFs for future 
generations. 129  In this scheme, extractive projects could commence and 
provide limited funding for present-day government spending while also 
saving a portion of non-renewable resource revenue until future generations 
and leaders can responsibly guide government spending priorities.130 
International civil society organizations have advocated for Myanmar 
to refrain from approving additional natural resource extraction projects until 
good governance, human rights, and environmental best practices emerge to 
more responsibly manage extractive revenues from these projects.131  This is 
a sensible course of action to preserve resources and revenue for future 
generations, but it is understandable why cash-starved states like Myanmar 
would be reluctant to pause or cancel multi-billion dollar international 
agreements needed to fund government operations. 
Ultimately, while people may hope that governance only improves 
over time, there is no guarantee that tomorrow’s leaders will be better 
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equipped to manage state resources for national benefit.  Authors Robert 
Carling and Stephen Kircher argue that government savings are deferred 
future government spending and found no basis to assume that investment 
decisions will be more “correct” in the future regardless of the virtuousness 
of new ruling parties.132  Myanmar’s current political leadership is limited in 
its technical, legal, and financial expertise.133  Additionally, Myanmar’s 
rising opposition party, the National League for Democracy (“NLD”), is 
composed of the same individuals mentioned in Section I, who are not yet 
any more legally or financially qualified to responsibly allocate funds in the 
future should the party continue its ascension into leadership roles. 134   
Even SWFs with expert guidance are not guaranteed to fulfill 
intergenerational justice obligations or serve as a final benchmark necessary 
to allow additional extractive activities.135  As a result, Myanmar must weigh 
its commitment to preserving resources and revenues for future generations 
prior to establishing a SWF.   
Moreover, despite previously discussed pressures for domestic 
management, onlookers may instead suggest that SWFs be managed by 
foreign experts who can be trusted to make responsible decisions with 
SWFs.  This logic also depends on substantial assumptions.  Even when 
managed by external legal and financial expertise, SWFs are not 
fundamentally guaranteed to yield profits due to economic downturns or 
poor management decisions. 136   
Norway’s SWF, the NGPG, is considered a world-class example of 
good governance, transparency, and fund management.137  However, in 
2008, the fund was not immune from the global financial crisis and lost 23% 
of its value, or approximately USD 100 billion.138  Moreover, funds can 
suffer even under the expert management of world leading financial services 
providers.  In 2007, Goldman Sachs lost 98% of Libya’s USD 1.3 billion 
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SWF.139  Furthermore, in 2011, even after the worst of the financial crisis, 
Bahrain’s USD 9 billion fund lost USD 717 million.140   
Lastly, SWFs meant to be saved for future generations have 
occasionally been used as “rainy day” funds during state emergencies.141  As 
mentioned above, following the global financial crisis, Ireland was forced to 
take EUR 17.5 billion (USD 23.1 billion) from its SWF, the National 
Reserve Pensions Fund, and its additional cash reserves as part of its broader 
European Union (“EU”) bailout package.142  Similarly, in 2011, Portugal 
raided EUR 5.6 billion (USD 7.4 billion) from its pension fund to meet EU 
and IMF fiscal targets.143  
Given Myanmar’s previously described lack of fiscal discipline, 
onlookers should be skeptical that Myanmar would be able to resist similar 
fund usage in situations where well-governed Organization for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development (“OECD”) countries have not, given 
governmental realities described throughout this paper.  Countries like 
Myanmar should establish a safety net against unexpected crises and 
emergencies, but countries should also be mindful that funds in a SWF will 
likely be the first target in future fiscal emergencies. 
Investment is based on a tolerance for risk, and these critiques do not 
advocate against investing resource wealth solely because of inherent 
downside risks.  Instead, these examples merely emphasize that SWFs, even 
under expert guidance, are not guaranteed to yield profits.  Accordingly, 
countries like Myanmar must decide whether investments with a SWF are 
better uses of state revenue than investments in state and social services that 
can otherwise contribute to nation building. 
D. Opportunity Cost 
Opportunity cost is an economic term that describes the cost of 
pursuing one decision and forgoing another.144  Policymakers must consider 
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the opportunity cost of investing revenue abroad in a SWF over the benefits 
of making investments in the local economy to expand domestic growth and 
provide social services.  
Similar to the aforementioned concerns about capital loss or 
destruction, SWFs can also underperform compared against other options 
available to governments. 145  A team of researchers evaluating Australia’s 
Future Fund found that the Fund had a negative 0.3% return compared to 
investing in standard government ninety day bank bills, essentially 
questioning Australia’s decision to invest in a SWF at all.146 
Alaska’s SWF has recognized the need to assess opportunity costs in 
its founding legislation.  In recognition of the need for diversification, 
Section 37.13.120 of Alaska’s Permanent Fund (“APF”) founding law states: 
 
(c) The board shall maintain a reasonable diversification among 
investments unless, under the circumstances, it is clearly 
prudent not to do so.  The board shall invest the assets of the 
fund in in-state investments to the extent that in-state 
investments are available and if the in-state investments (1) 
have a risk level and expected return comparable to alternate 
investment opportunities . . . .147 
 
This distinction is not prevalent in all SWF founding legislation and 
Alaska’s SWF defines its opportunity cost assessment slightly differently 
than some other SWFs’ specifications for maximizing investments.  For 
example, the NGPG specifies in the opening section of its Investment 
Mandate that “[section 1-2(3)] the bank shall seek to achieve the highest 
possible return after costs . . .”148 and that “[section 3-5(9)] [the] real estate 
portfolio shall be well diversified in geography, and over sectors, properties, 
and instruments.” 149  The APF and the NGPG are leading global examples 
of good governance, so while this particular divergence in language is 
modest, both examples emphasize the need to include provisions for 
opportunity cost assessments in fund legislation. 
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A variety of literature has also explored the benefits of funding 
domestic projects with extractive revenue in the present.  A report by the 
Revenue Watch Institute found that domestic investments funded by 
extractive revenue, such as increasing domestic skills, health, or security, 
may have higher social rates of return compared to SWF assets that are 
“sterilized abroad and therefore [make domestic investments] a better way to 
transfer wealth across generations.”150  The same report also cites two other 
reports of particular relevance to Myanmar.  First, one report found in 2004 
that countries with low capital stock earn greater benefits from spending oil 
wealth on present-day public spending needs rather than saving for the 
future. 151  Second, the report cites a study by Frederick Van der Ploeg and 
Anthony J. Venables that indicates that countries should only establish a 
SWF after accelerating state development with accumulations of public and 
private capital or risk stunting growth.152  These examples demonstrate the 
negative opportunity cost of a country like Myanmar investing extractive 
revenue in a SWF at the present time. 
Furthermore, a World Bank report on the use of domestic investments 
with SWFs argues general public investment can be categorized as either 
investments that seek financial returns, or investments in “broader economic 
or social terms.”153  In clarifying these social terms, the article acknowledges 
that “[s]ome worthy investments might have no direct financial returns at all, 
and may instead require years of recurrent spending to realize a value for the 
country.” 154  Early childhood education is one example of this type of long-
term recurrent cost. 155  As a result, the same report argues that SWFs are 
meant to serve the primary function of generating profit, and therefore, 
“should not invest in projects that are justified primarily by their economic 
or social externalities.156  Such investments should be funded through the 
normal budget process, which should also make provision for the future 
recurrent costs necessary for operations and maintenance.”157 
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Myanmar is a country already in crisis after decades of poor economic 
management and, “the opportunity cost of saving for future challenges when 
Myanmar already exhibits extensive symptoms of state failure . . . is not in 
Myanmar’s social or economic best interests.” 158  As a result, per the urging 
of the World Bank report above, Myanmar should fund all social spending 
through standard budgetary processes rather than by creating a SWF to do 
the same. 
E. Social Contract 
Falling victim to the resource curse can erode the “social contract” 
between governments and citizens.  The term social contract refers to the 
public’s consent to be governed and pay taxes in return for their 
government’s provision of various social and security services.159  In theory, 
government leaders are then held accountable to citizens for the proper 
allocation of taxes and the provision of services.160  However, dependence 
on resource revenues can reduce or eliminate the need for public tax 
collection and therefore can undermine the accountability of public 
officials.161  Sovereign wealth funds have been proposed to assist efforts to 
repair broken social contracts using dividend payments to populations.162 
The APF is one example of a SWF dividend payment system.163  However, a 
similar SWF dividend system may not be the optimal use of all SWFs, and 
Myanmar presently lacks the preexisting legal and managerial capacities that 
account for the APF’s success with dividend payments. 
A recent publication by the Center for Global Development 
recognized this problem and suggested that SWFs could be established to 
repair social contracts in states suffering from the resource curse. 164  The 
article argues that SWFs can collect resource profits then make cash 
transfers directly to citizens as a way to build social contracts.165  Transfers, 
also known as dividends, could provide citizens a share of resource profits 
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while creating taxable income.  Taxed income could then function as the 
basis for the public to hold officials accountable for providing services.166   
The use of SWFs to provide individual dividends, rather than funding 
a pension system to individuals, is currently in practice in Alaska.167  The 
APF receives 25% of revenues from the state’s oil resources and has grown 
in value from its initial deposit of USD 734,000 in 1977 to over USD 40 
billion in 2012.168  The APF provides annual payments to all Alaskan 
residents and in 2012 the Fund paid an annual dividend of USD 878.169  
Alaska’s dividend arrangement is designed to fit the state’s specific 
needs, and multiple legislative components enshrined in Alaska’s 
constitution are directly responsible for the APF’s success while also 
providing SWF good governance standards, as outlined below.170  First, 
Sections 37.13.020, 37.13.40, and 37.13.050 clearly outline the APF’s goals, 
the composition of the Fund’s controlling structure, and the qualifications of 
the APF’s board of trustees, respectively. 171  Second, investment 
responsibilities are clearly and extensively defined in Section 37.13.120.172  
Third, similar to strict allocation rules present in Trinidad and Tobago’s 
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The people of the state, by constitutional amendment, have required the placement 
of at least 25 percent of all mineral lease rentals, royalties, royalty sale proceeds, and 
federal mineral revenue sharing payments and bonuses received by the state into a 
permanent fund. The legislature finds with respect to the fund that 
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return; 
(3) the fund should be used as a savings device managed to allow the maximum use 
of disposable income from the fund for purposes designated by law. 
 
Sec. 37.13.030. Purpose. 
It is the purpose of AS 37.13.010 - 37.13.190 to provide a mechanism for the 
management and investment of those fund assets by the Alaska Permanent Fund 
Corporation in a manner consistent with the findings in AS 37.13.020. 
 
Sec. 37.13.040. Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation.  The Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation is a public 
corporation and government instrumentality in the Department of Revenue, managed by the board of 
trustees.  Id. at § 37.13.010–.190.  The purpose of the corporation is to manage and invest the assets of the 
permanent fund and other funds designated by law.  Id.  
172 Id. § 37.13.120. 
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Heritage Stabilization Fund, the APF ensures fund sustainability by 
legislating that “[i]ncome available for distribution equals 21 percent of the 
net income of the fund for the last five fiscal years, including the fiscal year 
just ended, but may not exceed net income of the fund for the fiscal year just 
ended plus the balance in the earnings reserve account . . . .”173  Lastly, the 
law’s Reports and Publications section sets out transparency guidelines in 
explicit detail, not present in many other SWF laws.  One such transparency 
example is the following requirement: 
 
By September 30 of each year, the board shall publish a report 
of the fund for distribution to the governor and the public.  The 
board shall notify the legislature that the report is available.  
The report shall be written in easily understandable language.  
The report must include financial statements audited by 
independent outside auditors, a statement of the amount of 
money received by the fund from each investment during the 
period covered, a statement of investments of the fund 
including an appraisal at market value, a description of fund 
investment activity during the period covered by the report, a 
comparison of the fund performance with the intended goals 
contained in AS 37.13.020,…recommendations of any needed 
changes, and any other information the board believes would be 
of interest to the governor, the legislature, and the public.  The 
annual income statement and balance sheet of the fund shall be 
published in at least one newspaper in each judicial district.174 
 
The APF attributes its own success to its creation through a state 
constitutional amendment, strong legislative oversight, public transparency, 
sound management practices (including managerial performance 
evaluations), internal consensus, public consent, and the prohibition against 
using the Fund as a development fund.175  However, establishing a social 
contract is notably not one of the APF’s goals.  
The concept of SWF dividend payments has also received sharp 
criticism in academia, thereby raising questions of whether Myanmar should 
use a SWF to implement a dividend-based method for developing a social 
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contract. 176  Distributing dividend payments instead of reinvesting wealth 
reduces the amount of money that could be invested with a SWF.177  
Moreover, dividend payments disregard intergenerational justice concerns 
because profits shared individually in the present deplete resources and 
neglect to provide benefits to future citizens.  Lastly, providing dividend 
payments and spreading wealth within the country essentially negate anti-
Dutch Disease effects that SWFs in resource-dependent states are often 
established to originally mitigate.178 
Logistically, it is also unclear how dividend payments in Myanmar 
could be expanded to cover additional taxable income and create a 
sustainable taxation system.  According to Sean Turnell, Myanmar’s tax 
system is “disorganized, arbitrary, and extraordinarily inefficient at raising 
revenues,” and taxes are often collected in an unofficial manner from local 
authorities.179  Given Myanmar’s inability to efficiently collect money from 
its citizens, one must be skeptical of the government’s ability to do the 
reverse and effectively provide money to its citizens.  Without expanding 
legitimate taxable income beyond dividend payments, taxes collected on 
these transfers would simply be overstated prior to tax collection. 
Citizens would not likely object to receiving a share of resource 
profits, but this process could create a dependence on the government’s 
provision of revenue that might fluctuate over time given petroleum 
commodities’ high price volatility.180  Alarmingly, this dependence could 
then duplicate price volatility problems on a household level if individuals 
build personal budgets based on government dividend payments that 
fluctuate without warning.  
Myanmar presently lacks the preexisting legal and managerial 
capacities that account for the APF’s success with dividend payments.  
Establishing a similar dividend-paying fund to rebuild a broken social 
contract would not create accountable governance institutions in Myanmar.  
Ultimately, Myanmar must demonstrate its commitment to governance and 
transparency best practices while legitimizing its existing tax collection 
system to strengthen its social contract with its citizens.  This process cannot 
be shortcut with a SWF. 
                                                      
176  Cummine, supra note 22.  
177  Id. at 2 
178  Id. at 13. 
179  See Turnell, supra note 49. 
180  See supra Part IV.B.2 
608 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 23 NO. 3 
F. Conflict  
Decisions to establish a SWF require a degree of political consensus  
to agree on fund objectives, determine allocation levels, and mandate how 
investment funds can be withdrawn.  Achieving political consensus depends 
on agreement between domestic political factions, public discourse 
permitting the use of state resources, and an equitable system for distributing 
wealth.  Unfortunately, Myanmar’s domestic political divisions between the 
military and the NLD, its inability to freely gauge public opinion regarding 
resources in which all citizens share a stake, and inequitable distribution of 
wealth, create sources of conflict that raise the question of whether 
Myanmar is presently prepared to forge the consensus needed to establish a 
SWF.181 
 
1. Domestic Political Divisions 
 
Existing domestic political support for creating a SWF is essential for 
establishing SWF objectives, allocating funding levels, and outlining 
withdrawal policies.  As a result, political divisions must be recognized prior 
to establishing a fund.182  The situations in Chad, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, 
described below, demonstrate that a lack of political consensus can endanger 
a SWF.  Similarly, Myanmar has unsettled political divisions, notably a 
military that is unwilling to relinquish control and a critical election in 2015 
that may re-orient the country’s political landscape.183 
The Republic of Chad is a leading example of what can happen when 
SWFs fail to recognize changing political interests prior to their creation.  In 
1999, the World Bank mandated that Chad legislate clear governance 
standards for the country’s oil revenues prior to receiving World Bank 
financing and guarantees towards a 650-mile, USD 4.1 billion pipeline to 
Cameroon. 184   In meeting these obligations, Article 1 of the Revenue 
Management Plan defined the specific petroleum projects that would provide 
revenue to special investment funds, and Article 3 ensured a layer of 
international oversight by specifying that, “[resources] shall be deposited 
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into special accounts of an international financing institution opened in the 
name of the Republic of Chad and referred to as the offshore escrow 
accounts.”185   
Following their creation, the escrow accounts were held in a Citibank 
account in London under the guidance of the World Bank and an 
independent body of experts.186  Furthermore, Article 9 stipulated that, “[t]he 
10% remainder of the direct resources, royalties and dividends mentioned in 
Article 3 of this Law shall be deposited in a Savings Account opened in an 
international financing institution on behalf of future generations, in 
accordance with the rules of the Bank of the Central African States 
(BEAC).”187  This law was then passed by Chad’s National Assembly and 
signed by President Deby. 
Five years later, Chad’s President Deby leveraged his own political 
connections and existing political divisions in the country to successfully 
circumvent layers of built-in fund protection by championing subsequent 
amendments to overhaul the fund’s predetermined annual payout structures. 
188  In opposition to the World Bank, President Deby scrapped Article 9’s 
provision of funds set aside for intergenerational equity concerns and 
proposed legislation that doubled the percentage of petroleum revenue that 
could be spent without oversight.189  In addition, the President designated the 
military and judiciary as priority sectors in need of the Fund’s reserves, 
thereby reducing shared funding to poverty reduction initiatives. 190   
Thereafter, President Deby branded the World Bank’s opposition to these 
changes as foreign efforts to attack Chad’s national sovereignty and 
succeeded in getting his revisions passed by the National Assembly with 119 
votes in favor to 13 votes opposed.191  
Nigeria has also encountered related difficulties reaching political 
consensus over the management of their proposed SWFs.  Nigeria recently 
allocated an initial contribution of USD 1 billion to launch an oil-funded 
SWF. Immediately thereafter, thirty-six state governors filed court 
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submissions to block the SWF’s creation because annual payouts would 
decrease the pool of oil profits distributed to individual states and because 
the governors did not trust the leaders in control of the fund. 192  
In addition, political divisions may complicate planning for which 
government branch should oversee a SWF.  For example, Zimbabwe’s main 
political parties, Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front 
(“ZANU-PF”) and Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) were formerly 
deadlocked about which state ministry should house its proposed SWF.193 
Zimbabwe has been governed by an acrimonious power-sharing agreement 
between ZANU-PF and MDC that was brokered by international parties 
following a streak of election violence in 2008.194  Since that time, these 
political parties have divided control over different branches of government 
until President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF party claimed victory in a 2013 
election condemned as illegitimate by Western governments.195  At the time 
of publication, it is unclear whether a compromise similar to the 2008 
agreement will arise to divide government powers.  As a result, the ministry 
that houses a potential SWF would determine which political party can set 
spending priorities with that amount of the country’s resource wealth. 
Myanmar has similar political divisions that must be resolved prior to 
establishing a SWF.  First, Myanmar’s most recent 2008 constitution 
establishes a set number of military seats in Myanmar’s parliament, the 
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.196  According to Chapter 109, “The Pyithu Hluttaw197 
shall be formed with a maximum of 440 Hluttaw representatives…(b) not 
more than 110 Pyithu Hluttaw representatives who are the Defence Services 
personnel nominated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services in 
accord with the law.”198  Similarly, Chapter 141 states, “The Amyotha 
Hluttaw 199  shall be formed with a maximum of 224 Hluttaw 
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representatives . . . [and] (b) 56 Amyotha Hluttaw representatives who are 
the Defence Services personnel nominated by the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Defence Services in accord with the law.”200  Together, these articles 
guarantee the military 25% of elected seats in parliament.201  Despite the 
NLD’s previous success winning parliament seats in the 2012 election, the 
military has expressed its unwillingness to relinquish control and believes it 
must “safeguard” ongoing reforms.202 
In addition, Myanmar is approaching a critical election in 2015 that 
has the potential to reorient the country’s political landscape.  Even after her 
release from house arrest and her election to parliament, Nobel-laureate, 
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, is currently barred from running for president under 
Chapter 59(f) of the 2008 Myanmar constitution on the basis that “one of 
their legitimate children or their spouses not owe allegiance to a foreign 
power, not be subject of a foreign power or citizen of a foreign country.” 203   
Suu Kyi’s two adult-aged children are British citizens and were raised in the 
United Kingdom by Suu Kyi’s deceased husband, Michael Ayers.204  This 
provision is highly criticized by pro-democracy forces in Myanmar because 
it unjustly targets Suu Kyi to prevent her and the NLD from leading 
additional progressive reforms.205  However, in March 2013, The Irrawaddy, 
an online news publication focused on Myanmar, reported that two former 
military generals who are current members of parliament proposed 
amending Myanmar’s constitution to remove restrictions on Suu Kyi from 
serving as president.206  These revisions are still pending at the time of this 
article’s publication. 
Lastly, in April 2012, Suu Kyi’s political party, the NLD, won forty-
three out of forty-four parliament seats in national by-elections.207  If the 
NLD continues its parliamentary success as expected, the country could 
potentially be governed by a broad number of new representatives each with 
their own interests for how to manage resource profits. 208  As a result, 
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establishing long-term financial planning tools, such as a SWF, should at 
least wait until after the next election in order to reasonably gauge prevailing 
political opinions about the necessity of creating a fund and defining its 
investment objectives. 209 
 
2. Public Consent 
 
Public opinion and consent should be incorporated into state decisions 
for approving extractive projects and setting spending priorities with project 
profits.  Resource revenue is a country’s birthright and citizens should have 
an unencumbered ability to express their opinions on how national public 
property is allocated.210  While communication systems have become more 
accessible in 2013, only 1% of the country has reliable Internet access and 
approximately only 5% of the population uses mobile phones. 211  
Resultantly, without alternative technology, public assembly remains a 
primary, basic form of public discourse in Myanmar.  Therefore, Myanmar’s 
new era of legislative reforms should ensure support for freedoms to 
assemble, express public opinions, and consent to extractive projects before 
extractive projects are approved. 212  However, two overarching problems, 
described in detail below, stand in the way of unhindered public consent: 
Myanmar’s existing legislation does not protect these internationally 
recognized freedoms, and Myanmar lacks or inconsistently meets its 
obligations to implement international treaties.  
In July 2012, the government of Myanmar passed the Decree on the 
Right to Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession (“the Decree”).213  This 
law is one of Myanmar’s first examples of civil rights legislation following 
the country’s recent political reforms.214  However, civil society groups have 
criticized the Decree because it lacks sufficient protections for basic 
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freedoms of expression or assembly and creates burdensome requirements 
for organizing demonstrations.215  In addition, the Decree also breaks from 
international best practice by allowing the state to prohibit public gatherings, 
vaguely defined as situations “if the security of the State, rule of law, public 
tranquility and the existing laws protecting the public are to be breached.” 216   
Lengthy application requirements set in Chapter 2(1) also state that a 
person who wants to exercise either the right to peaceful assembly or 
peaceful procession must apply for the permission at least five days in 
advance. 217  Moreover, Chapter 3 sets out thirteen lengthy administrative 
processes necessary to obtain a permit and navigate appeals.218  Lastly, the 
Decree places unrealistic levels of personal liability on event organizers by 
requiring, “the main applicant or organization must take the responsibilities 
of all attendees during, either, the peaceful assembly or peaceful procession 
or the peaceful assembly and peaceful procession is carrying out in 
accordance with the permission granted.”219 
Myanmar has also used Penal Code 505(b) to prohibit peaceful public 
demonstrations even as recently as June 2013.220   Outlining the harsh 
penalties from violating what is otherwise an accepted human right, Penal 
Code 505(b)’s harsh punish states,  
 
Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement, rumour 
or report . . . (b) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause 
fear or alarm to the public or to any section of the public 
whereby any person may be induced to commit an offense 
against the State or against the public tranquility . . . shall be 
punished with imprisonment which may extend to two years, or 
with fine, or with both.221 
 
Myanmar is similarly failing to meet its obligations to implement 
international human rights treaties that would enhance good governance 
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practices and protect freedoms of assembly and expression.222  In a 2013 
assessment of rule of law in Myanmar, a group of international pro-bono 
legal advisors found that Myanmar’s government has, “performed no 
assessment regarding the compatibility of existing Myanmar law with its 
obligations under international law,” and that “there remains a substantial 
gap between the treaties signed by the Myanmar government and the 
implementation of rights protected by the treaties in practice.” 223  Among 
the laws listed as incompatible with international obligations and of 
relevance to public consent are Myanmar’s Penal Code 505(b), State 
Protection Act, and Myanmar’s Code of Criminal Procedure. 224     
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (“UDHR”), passed in 
1948 by the United Nations General Assembly (“UNGA”), provides 
protections for freedom of expression and assembly and is generally 
considered a non-binding principle of customary international law for U.N. 
member states.225  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”) also protects these rights. 226   However, Myanmar is not a 
signatory to the ICCPR or similar treaties protecting human rights. 227  
Nonetheless, Myanmar has taken some steps to alleviate these 
concerns.  In September 2011, President Thein Sein issued Notification No. 
34, creating a Myanmar National Human Rights Commission (hereinafter 
“the Commission”) tasked with, “promoting and safeguarding fundamental 
rights of citizens described in the constitution of the Republic of the Union 
of Myanmar.”228  The Commission has taken commendable steps such as 
calling for the release of political prisoners and recommending Myanmar 
join the ICCPR.229  However, civil society organizations have faulted the 
Commission’s noncompliance with the United Nation’s Principles Relating 
to the Status of National Human Rights Institutions, otherwise known as the 
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“Paris Principles.” 230   The Paris Principles were adopted in 1993 and 
establish a set of recommendations for national human rights institutions 
(“NHRIs”), among which are recommendations that emphasize the need for 
NHRIs to function independently from central government operations in 
order to produce untainted assessments of problem areas.231 
At the core of the issue, the Commission was established by a 
presidential notification, 232  rather than abiding by the Paris Principles’ 
requirement that “[a] national institution shall be given as broad a mandate 
as possible, which shall be clearly set forth in a constitutional or legislative 
text, specifying its composition and its sphere of competence [Competencies 
and Responsibilities (2)].”233  Therefore, the creation of the Commission is 
commendable, but legislating its existence would allay concerns that the 
commission can be altered or subject to financial pressure based on future 
political desires. 
Inadequate access to alternative information, legislation that blocks 
freedom of expression and assembly, and noncompliance with international 
best practices and treaties effectively limit citizens from publically debating 
critical information.  Myanmar and international parties must not establish a 
SWF before free public discourse can at least have an unrestricted 
opportunity to weigh the benefits of creating a fund and define investment 
objectives with extractive resource profits.  
 
3. Equitable Wealth Distribution 
 
States or divisions within a country that depend on their areas’ 
resource wealth are often cautious about funneling extractive profits into a 
national fund because projects may reap local resources without providing 
local benefits.234  As a result, countries should clearly articulate the land and 
property rights that govern the use of local, state, and federal resources. 
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The aforementioned example of Nigeria’s state governors petitioning 
against creating a SWF due to a decline in regional profit sharing is a prime 
example of equitable wealth sharing concerns.235  The Nigeria Sovereign 
Investment Authority (“NSIA”) was established in 2011 to manage three 
separate SWFs using Nigeria’s oil wealth. 236   Pursuant to the NSIA’s 
founding legislation, the initial funds would be “provided by the Federal, 
State, Federal Capital Territory, Local Government and Area Council of the 
Federation . . . [and] shall be the Naira equivalent of the sum of USD 1 
billion. [Part 3, Section 29(1)].”237  In addition, the law stipulates that each 
of the government authorities listed above, “shall contribute a percentage of 
such initial funding equal to each such Government’s share of Federation 
revenue in accordance with the formula stated in the Allocation of Revenue 
(Federation Account, etc.) Act [Part 3, Section 29(2)].” 238 
Each of Nigeria’s thirty-six state governors, collectively known as the 
Nigeria Governors Forum, subsequently went to court to block the SWFs’ 
creation because these requirements to fund national funds would reduce 
revenues to individual states.239  Criticism by the governors is generally 
based on two articles in Nigeria’s 1999 constitution.  First, Section 80 (1) 
states that,  
 
All revenues or other moneys raised or received by the 
Federation (not being revenues or other moneys payable under 
this Constitution or any Act of the National Assembly into any 
other public fund of the Federation established for a specific 
purpose) shall be paid into and form one Consolidated Revenue 
Fund of the Federation.240  
 
In addition, under Section 162:  
 
(1) The Federation shall maintain a special account to be called 
“the Federation Account” into which shall be paid all revenues 
collected by the Government of the Federation . . . [and] (3) 
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Any amount standing to the credit of the Federation Account 
shall be distributed among the Federal and State Governments 
and the Local Government Councils in each State . . . .241 
 
Taken together, the Nigeria Governors Forum argued that funds may not be 
legally deposited into SWFs under the NSIA and that depositing these funds 
violated Section 162’s provision of state-level revenue sharing.242  According 
to former Lagos State Governor, Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu, Nigeria’s 
states are desperately in need of money, and Tinubu has drawn the analogy 
that allowing the federal government to save for long term needs at a time of 
crisis is similar to not paying for life saving medical treatment for a sick 
child because you are saving for their future.243   
In May 2013, Nigeria’s Supreme Court heard arguments from the 
Federal Government and the Nigeria Governors Forum, and presiding Judge 
Walter Onnonoghen commented that, on the issue of revenue sharing, “there 
is nothing constitutional about money sharing but negotiation,” thus 
recommending that any state revenue sharing must be determined through 
state and federal negotiation.244  Judge Onnonoghen urged both sides to 
negotiate this point out of court before their next scheduled court appearance 
on December 2, 2013. 245 
The Nigeria case study highlights constitutional revenue sharing 
issues in developing petroleum states; however, even well diversified 
Western economies may share these same concerns.  Madelaine Drohan, a 
Canadian correspondent for The Economist, recently recommended in a 
report on SWFs that the Canadian International Council should not establish 
a national Canadian SWF because doing so would deny or reduce revenue to 
Canada’s individual provinces that are dependent on extractive projects in 
those areas.246  
Myanmar’s ongoing regional divisions only underline the need to 
ensure that extractive projects transfer benefits to local communities else 
provide additional reasons for conflict.  Kachin State, one of Myanmar’s 
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ethnic states with plentiful jade resources, is a notable example.247  In June 
2011, a seventeen-year ceasefire broke down between the Kachin 
Independence Army and Myanmar’s military and displaced approximately 
100,000 people.248  According to Richard Horsey, a former U.N. senior 
official in Myanmar, “such vast revenues – in the hands of both sides – have 
certainly fed into conflict, helped fund insurgency, and will be a hugely 
complicating factor in building a sustainable peace economy.”249   
In order to prevent further conflict, basic land rights that intersect with 
extractive resource reserves and revenue distribution must be enshrined in 
law prior to creating SWFs that may detract critical funds from certain 
regions.  Of particular note, Myanmar’s constitution and two of Myanmar’s 
highly criticized existing land laws, the Farmland Act and the Vacant, 
Fallow, and Virgin Lands Management Law (“VFV Law”), both detailed 
below, underscore the need to revise the governance of natural resources 
before establishing a fund to reap the benefits of local lands. 
Myanmar’s constitution clearly restricts ownership of extractive 
resources and states,  
 
The [Myanmar] Union: (a) is the ultimate owner of all lands 
and all natural resources above and below the ground, above 
and beneath the water and in the atmosphere in the Union; [and] 
(b) shall enact necessary law to supervise extraction and 
utilization of State-owned natural resources by economic forces 
[Article 37]. 250    
 
Therefore, on a basic level, regional or state-level profit sharing will remain 
limited as long as this provision is intact.   
The Farmland Act, enacted in March 2012, affirms the State’s 
ownership of all farmland in Myanmar.251  Under the Farmland Act, farmers 
must receive permission from the government before they harvest crops, 
even on generations-old family land. 252  In addition, the law claims all above 
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and belowground extractive resources as property of the state without any 
profit-sharing provisions for local communities. 253  Lastly, the Farmland Act 
also curtails existing legislation that previously allowed partial collective 
unionization rights. 254 
The VFV Law, also passed in March 2012, grants the government 
control over state or regional resources.255  Conditions governing the use of 
land include that, “If natural resources are found in the authorized land and 
the Government being desirous of extracting the same on a commercial basis 
resumes the area required therefrom, it shall be surrendered as directed by 
the Union government.”256 In addition, the law also enables the country’s 
Central Body of Vacant, Fallow, and Wilderness Land Management to re-
designate vacant, fallow, and virgin land as “farmland.”257  Reclassified 
farmland can then be granted to “farmers.” 258   
Two critical issues arise from this process.  First, a Reuters Special 
Report found in 2012 that occupied farmland deliberately left vacant as part 
of annual crop cycles, or generational family land without official land titles, 
was labeled “vacant” and confiscated by the Myanmar government.259  
Second, the government’s definition of “farmer” is irresponsibly defined to 
include state officials, politically connected crony tycoons, and foreign 
investors. 260  The government can therefore grant these “farmers” the ability 
to develop up to 50,000 acres of “vacant” farmland to develop industrial raw 
materials. 261  Alarmingly, if this legal manipulation was not blatant enough, 
the government can expropriate land from inhabitants when vaguely defined 
“national interests” are at stake, and any traditional farmers who refuse to 
leave confiscated land will face prison sentences, fines, or both. 262 
Policymakers and citizens should not allow a SWF to make 
investments with funds that are inequitably obtained from project areas.  As 
a result, Myanmar must resolve its land ownership and resource profit-
sharing disputes before establishing a SWF.  Failure to do so can further 
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detract critical funds from specific regions without providing local benefits 
to at-risk populations. 
V. CUTTING THROUGH MYANMAR’S JUNGLE: TRANSPARENCY AND 
CORRUPTION  
Myanmar is one of the most corrupt and non-transparent countries in 
the world.263  In addition, global SWFs have a poor track record at serving as 
transparent features of good governance. 264   It follows that mixing 
Myanmar’s poor governance record and a SWF in Myanmar raises 
considerable governance and transparency concerns.  The following section 
illustrates the extent of global SWF transparency, and initiatives that may 
assist transparency in Myanmar.  The section then describes how corruption 
in Myanmar’s untransparent environment can impact SWF operations and 
overall state governance. 
A. Transparency 
Sovereign wealth fund transparency is an important component of 
holding governments accountable for national resource revenue. 265  
However, even though SWFs control over USD 5.5 trillion of global wealth, 
the general lack of transparency regarding SWF size, investment activity, 
leadership, and motivations is staggering.266  Lack of SWF transparency 
damages state finances and puts government bonds at risk of being 
downgraded.267  Myanmar’s historic corruption and poor transparency are 
reasons for concern that a Myanmar SWF would fall prey to the institutional 
governance and transparency deficiencies that have plagued the Myanmar 
ministries. The United States government has recently imposed transparency 
requirements for those investing in Myanmar, which may establish a degree 
of transparency best practices, but Myanmar should also reform its domestic 
legislation to do the same. 
                                                      
263  Corruption Perceptions Index 2011, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/ (last visited May 23, 2014). 
264 Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings, SWF INSTITUTE, http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/ 
(last visited May 23, 2014). 
265 Edwin Truman, Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Need for Greater Transparency and Accountability, 
PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Aug. 2007), http://www.iie.com/publications/interstitial. 
cfm?ResearchID=783.  
266 Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings, supra note 264. 
267 Ellsworth & Chinea, supra note 89. 
JUNE 2014  EVALUATING A MYANMAR SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND 621 
In a recent survey of SWFs, researchers found that seven of the least 
transparent global SWFs control approximately half of all SWF holdings, 
amounting to several trillion US dollars. 268  Multivariate tests have 
demonstrated a “strong and positive correlation between a country’s political 
and civil liberties and the quality and transparency of its sovereign wealth 
funds.”269  As a result, SWFs in OECD economies typically are considerably 
more transparent regarding their operations than SWFs based in non-OECD 
or developing countries.270  This is evident in states like Norway that 
maintain strict annual transparency procedures.271  In comparison, however, 
the United Arab Emirates’ Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, established in 
1976, controls over USD 627 billion of assets and only released limited 
information about its financial transactions for the first time in 2010.272  
The lack of SWF transparency can also damage the legitimacy of state 
finances.  Venezuela’s Fonden Fund, previously controlled personally by the 
late President Hugo Chavez, lacks congressional oversight and does not 
regularly disclose its investments.273  Due to the opaque nature of such a 
large percentage of state revenue, Erich Arispe, the director of Fitch Ratings 
Sovereign Group, previously commented that, “I can’t rate what I can’t see,” 
and signaled that Venezuela’s debt runs the risk of being downgraded 
because of fund transparency concerns.274  Downgraded credit raises the cost 
of borrowed capital,275 and downgrades such as these can be avoided by 
committing to more transparent legal and managerial best practices.276 
In addition, Revenue Watch Institute has identified very few cases 
when SWFs have increased state transparency, with exceptions in Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan.277  However, these states and their SWFs are governed by 
authoritative presidential decrees, so increased transparency has not 
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necessarily led to increased political openness or public participation in 
investment decisions.278 
In an effort to increase transparency and establish general best 
practices, in 2008, the International Working Group on Sovereign Wealth 
Funds (“IWG-SWF”) and the IMF put forward a set of twenty-four 
principles for SWF governance. 279   To date, twenty-six nations have 
committed to the IWG-SWF principles,280 known as the Santiago Principles. 
Among these principles are the requirements that, “the legal framework for 
the SWF . . . be sound and support its effective operation”281 and that funds 
be, “clear and publicly disclos[e] policies, rules, procedures, or arrangements 
in relation to the SWF’s general approach to funding, withdrawal, and 
spending operations.”282  Lastly, the Santiago Principles emphasize the need 
for SWF operations to be, “clearly defined in the relevant legislation, 
charter, other constitutive documents, or management agreement.” 283  
However, the voluntary nature of this transparency regime raises 
questions about countries’ real commitment to the Santiago Principles.  For 
example, Nigeria’s NSIA specifically mentions the Santiago Principles in 
Part 1, Article 4 (2)(d) of its founding legislation.284  The article stipulates 
that “[t]he [NSIA] . . . implement[s] best practices . . . respect[s] 
independence and accountability, corporate governance, transparency and 
reporting on performance as provided in this Act, including with due regard 
as appropriate for the Santiago Principles.” 285  The NSIA Act does not 
define “due regard as appropriate”286 and resultantly the parameters of this 
language are far too broad to be truly considered in adherence to the 
Santiago Principles.  This instance demonstrates that the Santiago Principles 
may serve as an effective guideline for fund creation, but do not inherently 
provide solutions to transparency concerns. 
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Myanmar’s historic corruption and poor transparency practices cast 
doubt on the proposition that a Myanmar SWF would escape the institutional 
governance and transparency deficiencies that have plagued the Myanmar 
ministries that would likely be tasked with overseeing a national SWF.  In 
fact, EarthRights International, a non-profit organization with an extensive 
focus on Myanmar’s extractive industry, found that Myanmar had 
unaccounted foreign exchange reserves in excess of hundreds of millions of 
US dollars held in two foreign Asian banks in 2009.287  Similar to a potential 
SWF, these funds are not included in annual budgets or subject to civil 
society oversight.288 
More recently, Myanmar has signaled its intention to join international 
transparency initiatives to address some of these concerns, and Western 
governments have set strict transparency guidelines for national companies 
investing in Myanmar. 289   Implementation of these transparency best 
practices parallel the current challenges faced in implementing transparency 
standards Myanmar would need to overcome before establishing a 
transparent national SWF. 
In 2012, Myanmar announced that it would become a signatory to the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (“EITI”).290  The EITI is a 
voluntary international initiative that requires extractive companies to self-
report payments to foreign governments. 291   Governments then report 
payments received from companies to a third party to verify that neither side 
has corruptly siphoned revenue.292  The EITI has been applied in thirty-six 
other countries, but experts and civil society groups have expressed concern 
that Myanmar may fail to adequately meet multiple core objectives of the 
EITI.293  In particular, concerns that Myanmar may fail to meet these 
objectives partially stems from EITI Requirement 4, which requires that:  
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(a) . . . implementation of the EITI is overseen by a multi-
stakeholder group comprising appropriate stakeholders, 
including—but not limited to—the private sector, civil society 
(including independent civil society groups and other civil 
society, such as the media and parliamentarians) and relevant 
government ministries . . . (d) Civil society groups involved in 
the EITI as members of the multi-stakeholder group must be 
operational, and, in policy terms, independent of government 
and/or companies . . . [and] (e) Members of the multi-
stakeholder group should be able to operate freely without 
restraint or coercion, including be liaising with their 
constituency groups.294   
 
Myanmar’s poor track record of encouraging civil liberties or enabling 
civil society activities may result in an inability to meet authentic multi-
stakeholder requirements as set forth in the EITI. 295  This is particularly 
problematic because EITI Requirement 4.1(a) tasks those multi-stakeholder 
groups to, “define, by agreement of the multi-stakeholder group, what these 
material payments and revenues comprise and what constitutes a pre-
defined, reasonable materiality threshold.”296  Therefore, the inability to 
forge authentic multi-stakeholder groups will prevent an authentic definition 
of what activities are considered material payments to governments, thereby 
potentially allowing an unobservable amount of corrupt revenue to continue 
flowing from extractive projects. 
In addition to the EITI’s international focus on extractive 
transparency, U.S. President Barack Obama recently praised Myanmar for 
the country’s commitment to join the Open Government Partnership 
Initiative (“OGP”), a separate international transparency body, by 2016 in 
his speech at the University of Yangon.297  The OGP is a global organization 
that aims to make governments more accountable, transparent, and effective 
to each country’s citizens through regularly released data and continuous 
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engagements with international parties and civil society groups.298  Similar 
to the EITI, global commentators remain cautiously optimistic that Myanmar 
can fulfill transparency obligations under the OGP.299 
Furthermore, American transparency requirements for investing in 
Myanmar may establish a degree of transparency best practices, 300 but 
Myanmar must consider the merits of enacting similar domestic legislation 
prior to creating a responsibly managed SWF.  Over the objections of Aung 
San Suu Kyi, in July 2012, President Obama announced that American 
companies would be allowed to invest in Myanmar and the country’s 
extractive sector.301  Following this decision, the U.S. Treasury Department 
issued General License 17, which allows investment in Myanmar contingent 
on satisfying conditions released under the “Responsible Investment 
Reporting Requirements (OMB No. 1405-0209).”302  This license requires 
U.S. individuals to report any investment with the Myanmar Oil and Gas 
Enterprise (“MOGE”), a military controlled agency focused on petroleum 
reserves. 303   In addition, Requirement 8 further forces a degree of 
transparency by setting a low basic payment materiality threshold when 
requiring that investors must:  
 
report total payments made by submitter or on its behalf valued 
over $10,000 during the reporting year to each Government of 
Burma entity and/or any sub-national or administrative 
governmental entity or non-state group that possesses or claims 
to possess governmental authority over the submitter’s new 
investment activities in Burma. 304 
 
Furthermore, the license requires releasing two annual reports 
regarding investment: one eight-point report for public consumption and a 
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second report for confidential government use. 305  The more comprehensive, 
confidential second report includes the eight points required by the 
publically disclosed report and also requires disclosing: 
 
9. Point of Contact: Name and contact information of 
individuals(s) responsible for preparing this report. The U.S. 
Government may request additional or clarifying 
information.306 
10. Military Communications: Has the submitter, or any 
individual from or representing the submitter, had meetings or 
other communications, including written and telephone 
communication, with the armed forces of Burma and/or other 
armed groups related to the submitter’s investments in 
Burma?307 
11. Risk Prevention and Mitigation: With regard to human 
rights, worker rights, anti-corruption, and/or environmental 
issues, summarize any risks and/or impacts identified, any steps 
taken to minimize risk and to prevent and mitigate such 
impacts, and policies and practices on risk prevention and 
mitigation.308 
 
International civil society organizations have called for these last three 
points to be made public because they often carry particularly critical 
consequences on state governance practices surrounding extractive sector 
operations.309  These points remain unchanged at the time of publication. 
Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act Rules, released by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), are additionally relevant for tracking extractive 
profits and payments.310  Extractive companies that trade on American 
public exchanges must disclose their payments for each project abroad in 
order for investors to be able to hold governments accountable for those 
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profits.311  These rules define payments to mean “a payment that is made to 
further the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals, is ‘not 
de minimis,’ and includes taxes, royalties, fees (including license fees), 
production entitlements, and bonuses.”312   
The EITI included several of these types of payments as suggested 
payments for multi-stakeholder groups to incorporate into materiality 
threshold determinations, but defining payments in these terms to be more 
comprehensive than the EITI was no mistake given the SEC’s explicit 
mention of the EITI.313  According to the SEC’s rules,  
 
the final rules are consistent with the EITI. In instances where 
the language or approach of Section 13(q) clearly deviates from 
the EITI, the final rules track the statute rather than the EITI 
because in those instances we believe [U.S.] Congress intended 
the final rules to go beyond what is required by the EITI. We 
believe this approach is consistent with Section 13(q) and 
furthers the statutory goal to support international transparency 
promotion efforts relating to the commercial development of 
oil, natural gas, or minerals because the EITI is referenced in 
Section 13(q) and is well-recognized for promoting such 
transparency. 314   
 
The United States’ standards that extend beyond EITI are positive for 
shaping transparency.  However, China, South Korea, India, and Thailand 
have historically served as Myanmar’s largest trading partners and would 
only be bound by these reporting requirements if their national companies 
trade on American exchanges or if Americans run their companies.  
Therefore, an important component of evaluating Myanmar’s transparency 
practices lies in the country’s domestic legislation. 
One specific domestic law would have especially critical impacts on 
Myanmar’s transparency and would likely lead a national SWF to fail. 
Myanmar’s Special Funds Law for Perpetuating National Sovereignty 
(hereinafter “the Special Fund Law”) allows the commander-in-chief of the 
military to request and receive discretionary special funds for “defending the 
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constitution and the State from external and internal threats.”315  The Special 
Fund lacks parliamentary oversight and Chapter 3, Article 5 even 
audaciously states that, “no individual person or organization is allowed to 
scrutinize or audit the usage of the Special Fund.”316  
The Special Funds Law has clear implications for a potential national 
SWF.  Even if Myanmar establishes a fully transparent SWF that is funded 
with transparent revenue in compliance with the aforementioned 
international commitments, the Special Funds Law could provide a domestic 
legal basis for Myanmar’s leaders to redirect transparent funds from the 
SWF to fund opaque operations from the Special Fund Account.  As a result, 
Myanmar must demonstrate its commitment to align domestic transparency 
best practices with international standards and initiatives before officials can 
be provided with an avenue to further siphon funds from the state. 
B. Corruption 
Domestic pressures and political corruption, broadly defined as the 
misuse of political authority, can negatively impact SWF performance.  This 
section discusses the extent of this pressure to examine Myanmar’s existing 
levels of corruption.  In doing so, the combination of Myanmar’s existing 
level of corruption and SWF’s general lack of transparency would put a 
Myanmar SWF at risk of succumbing to pressures for domestic involvement. 
This could include investing profits in domestic sectors, which could result 
in a fund that underperforms compared to investment options otherwise 
unhampered by domestic involvement.   
In a survey of 2,662 investments by twenty-nine SWFs made between 
1984 and 2007, a team of Harvard Business School (“HBS”) researchers 
found that the political process can introduce short-run pressures on SWFs to 
accommodate public demands for job creation and economic stabilization 
within the country and can lead to political intervention that sharply deviates 
from originally stated plans for long-term maximization.317  In addition, 
countries may acquiesce to pressures to grant politicians increased 
managerial input over SWF investments to achieve non-monetary domestic 
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objectives rather than ensuring financial experts and technocrats maximize 
investment returns.318   
The HBS researchers also compared SWF management to the 
International Country Risk Guide, a widely accepted indicator score for 
evaluating country corruption that ranks countries from zero (most corrupt) 
to ten (least corrupt), and discovered that each additional point of corruption 
yields a 10.8% greater likelihood that countries will focus funds to domestic 
investments.319  Disturbingly, the researchers then found that politically 
influenced funds that made direct domestic investments significantly 
underperformed by 16% in six months following investment compared to 
SWFs managed by foreign experts who would otherwise seek to make 
global investments for higher returns. 320 
Myanmar is plagued by corruption.  The 2011 Corruption Perception 
Index (“CPI”), an annual index released by Transparency International that 
rates perceptions of domestic corruption, found that Myanmar ranked 180th 
out of 183 countries as one of the most corrupt states in the world.321  Even 
during recent reforms, the 2012 CPI, the most recent version publically 
released, scored Myanmar at 172 out of 176 countries surveyed, ranking 
above only Sudan, Afghanistan, North Korea, and Somalia.322  According to 
a report by Quartz, Atlantic Media’s business-focused online news 
magazine, SWFs do not consistently lead to reductions of corruption in 
petroleum states,323 and as a partial result, SWFs can serve as slush funds for 
additional corruption.  One example of the corrupt use of SWFs is the 
Iranian Stabilization Fund (“ISF”).324  The ISF was initially designed to 
compensate for commodity price volatility and support entrepreneurial 
enterprises in expanding industries,325 but instead the ISF has financed 
“bonuses to government retirees, payments for gasoline imports, the 
expansion of the Basij (the volunteer militia) and the purchase of new police 
equipment.”326   
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The corrupt use of a SWF would have especially detrimental impacts 
for Myanmar amidst the country’s privatization reforms.  Myanmar has 
initiated a series of privatization reforms, known locally as “pocketization” 
because state owned businesses are sold off to well-connected individuals 
with deep crony ties to government leaders.327  If government leaders are 
successful in biasing fund objectives to direct SWF resources domestically, 
as predicted by the HBS team, a Myanmar SWF has an increased chance of 
being used as a seemingly legitimate way to further fund illegitimate crony 
interests under the guise of SWFs leading domestically-focused privatization 
reforms and economic development initiatives. 
Even worse, state officials potentially cannot be held accountable for 
these pocketization practices.  Chapter 445 of Myanmar’s constitution states, 
“No proceedings shall be instituted against the said Councils or any member 
thereof or any member of the Government, in respect of any act done in the 
execution of their respective duties.”328  Therefore, not only could corrupt 
government officials redirect funds from a SWF to support crony interests, 
but these individuals would actually be protected by law in the course of 
illicitly privatizing state resources. 
  Detailed analysis of SWF performance conducted by the HBS team 
raises concern that Myanmar’s own corrupt practices would negatively 
impact a potential SWF performance.  The ability to bias fund activities, 
combined with explicit indemnity offered to government officials in Chapter 
445 of Myanmar’s constitution, creates conditions that are inhospitable for 
proper fund management.  Resultantly, Myanmar should not establish a 
SWF until corrupt practices can be stymied and effective legal regulations 
hold government accountable for state resource revenue. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article draws global lessons from existing SWFs to speculate 
how creating a SWF with Myanmar’s resource profits would impact 
Myanmar and mitigate concerns associated with the resource curse.  
Following a thorough analysis, this article demonstrates that Myanmar 
currently lacks important components needed to establish and responsibly 
manage an effective SWF.   
Highlighting the reasons why Myanmar is not prepared to establish a 
SWF at the present time provides a snapshot of specific steps Myanmar can 
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implement to strengthen its governance and economic practices.  These steps 
are key components for Myanmar’s development, but would undoubtedly 
require deliberate and sustained effort.  However, in the course of pursuing 
these steps, Myanmar could simultaneously create conditions to establish a 
well-managed SWF in the future. 
Myanmar must continue to engage the international community to 
build the domestic legislative and financial skill sets needed to manage 
future legal, regulatory, and economic reforms.  The resulting framework 
will then ideally offer Myanmar’s rising experts an opportunity to build the 
fiscal discipline necessary to reconcile state spending priorities with the 
needs of the people and build an authentic balance of payments surpluses.  
During this time, Myanmar’s Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank must 
demonstrate their ability to manage resource revenue and macroeconomic 
concerns prior to outsourcing this responsibility to foreign advisors.   
Myanmar’s leaders should also recognize the importance of building a 
diversified economy with profits from non-renewable resources.  Building a 
self-sustaining domestic economy will be a monumental feat, but can be 
assisted by reforming agricultural practices with an aim at regaining world-
leading crop exports, providing credit to farmers to support upward growth, 
and improving product transportation networks.  Stabilization problems will 
always exist in varying degrees as Myanmar modernizes, but experts agree 
that building a diversified economic base is preferable to developing 
complex financial tools to mitigate problems caused by not supporting 
economic diversity.329 
Leaders who achieve this goal will be recognized by the population, 
thus rebuilding a social compact in a country long divided by military rule.  
In addition, governments and foreign investors focused on Myanmar’s 
resources should support civil society calls to formulate intergenerational 
justice strategies.  Successful efforts to build profit-sharing systems, even if 
they are not similar to the APF’s dividends, will equitably spread benefits of 
extractive projects to local citizens.  With a system to spread benefits, 
extractive companies and communities can share the desire to further 
develop natural resources while generating profits used to improve society. 
Bridging inherent political divides in Myanmar to achieve these goals 
will surely take time.  However, Myanmar has experienced monumental 
change in the past two years and it is impossible to speculate exactly what 
further reforms will occur after the country’s upcoming election in 2015.  As 
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a result, international onlookers should cautiously await the next election to 
gauge prevailing political opinions prior to establishing any kind of long-
term financial plans. 
Myanmar also has the ability to reform multiple controversial laws 
specified throughout this article.  The country can start by repealing Penal 
Code 505(b) and the Decree to allow citizens to freely voice opinions about 
the direction of their country and the use of the country’s non-renewable 
profits without fearing arrest.  Furthermore, the Farmland Law and the VFV 
Law should be amended to provide greater individual and local benefits, 
while also introducing legislation to define how regions most affected by 
extractive projects will benefit from continued project expansions.   
Lastly, there is no silver bullet to reverse the endemic corruption that 
has strangled Myanmar for decades.  However, to paraphrase United States 
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, “sunlight is the best disinfectant” and 
Myanmar can take strides towards reducing corruption by increasing 
transparency. 330  Ensuring Myanmar meets its expressed obligations to the 
EITI and OGP are great starting points, and designing domestic parallel 
structures to Western investment guidelines can help ensure that non-
Western based foreign investments do not take advantage of Myanmar or 
threaten governance building measures.  Similarly, in committing to these 
practices, Myanmar should define uses and oversight for the State Fund 
Account to complement ongoing transparency initiatives as well as add a 
layer of accountability to government officials by revising or repealing 
Chapter 445 of the constitution. 
These steps are admittedly ambitious and may take generations to 
ultimately accomplish.  However, the pace of the most recent reforms gives 
hope that these additional steps may be achievable in this lifetime and 
completed without dependence on complex financial instruments.   
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